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ARTICLE 
THE POSITIVE LAW MODEL  
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
William Baude & James Y. Stern 
For fifty years, courts have used a “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard to define 
“searches” under the Fourth Amendment.  As others have recognized, that doctrine is 
subjective, unpredictable, and conceptually confused, but viable alternatives have been 
slow to emerge.  This Article supplies one. 
We argue that Fourth Amendment protection should be anchored in background positive 
law.  The touchstone of the search-and-seizure analysis should be whether government 
officials have done something forbidden to private parties.  It is those actions that 
should be subjected to Fourth Amendment reasonableness review and the presumptive 
requirement to obtain a warrant.  In short, Fourth Amendment protection should 
depend on property law, privacy torts, consumer laws, eavesdropping and wiretapping 
legislation, anti-stalking statutes, and other provisions of law generally applicable to 
private actors, rather than a freestanding doctrine of privacy fashioned by courts on the 
fly. 
This approach rests on multiple grounds.  It is consistent with the history of the Fourth 
Amendment and with the structure of protection in the closely related area of 
constitutional property.  It draws upon fundamental principles of liberal constitu-
tionalism, namely a concern about abuse of official power.  And it is superior to current 
privacy-based doctrine in many practical ways: it is clearer, more predictable, more 
accommodating of variation in different times and places, and more sensitive to the 
institutional strengths of legislative bodies, particularly when it comes to issues 
presented by new technologies. 
It also has significant doctrinal implications.  Of most immediate importance, it 
provides a framework to analyze third-party problems — situations in which information 
about one person is obtained from another — that is more coherent and more attractive 
than the modern third-party doctrine.  It also provides a new framework for many other 
contested Fourth Amendment questions, from abandoned property and DNA to the use 
of drones. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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INTRODUCTION 
he touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis,” the Supreme 
Court has told us, “is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’”1  Such statements must 
be taken with a few grains of salt.  The Fourth Amendment protects 
against searches and seizures, but reasonable expectations of privacy 
have almost nothing to do with what qualifies as a seizure.2  Even for 
searches, the Court’s declaration is more than a little misleading.  It is, 
frankly, a truism that privacy is at stake when it comes to deciding 
what actions count as Fourth Amendment “searches”: to restrict the 
ability of government agents to act in ways likely to reveal information 
is necessarily to increase privacy.  The real issue isn’t whether some 
piece of information or place is in fact private but whether it should 
be.  Privacy is the answer to be given, not the question to be asked; the 
effect, not the cause. 
In practice, therefore, the fulcrum of the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” doctrine ends up being “reasonable,” not “privacy.”  And rea-
sonableness reduces either to a difficult empirical question about intui-
tions and social norms (those expectations “society is prepared to rec-
ognize as ‘reasonable’”3) or to a largely open-ended policy judgment 
(those expectations a court deems “legitimate”4).  In determining 
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, courts appear to ask 
themselves if the act at issue is the sort that government officials 
should be prohibited from taking without offering additional justifica-
tion or obtaining a warrant.5  At its core, in other words, the inquiry is 
little more than a restatement of the Fourth Amendment itself.  The 
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine could more accurately be 
described as the reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion doctrine.  Privacy is the MacGuffin of Fourth Amendment law.  It 
is the knob we twist because it looks “as if it could be used to turn on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); accord Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); see 
also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s purpose 
as “protection of the privacy of the individual, his right to be let alone”).  But see United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (discussed imminently and again in section I.B, infra pp. 1834–36). 
 2 See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61–64 (1992); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 113 (1984). 
 3 E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)  (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring)); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 151 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (same); see also 
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 740). 
 4 E.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44. 
 5 See ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 46 (2003). 
“ T
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some part of the machine,” but it is in reality “a mere ornament, not 
connected with the mechanism at all.”6 
The reasonable expectation of privacy concept has other serious de-
fects, including its ambiguous meaning, its subjective analysis, its un-
predictable application, its unsuitability for judicial administration, 
and its potential circularity.  We are happy to repeat these criticisms 
but we are hardly the first to raise them.  They have been exhaustively 
developed in Fourth Amendment scholarship over the last half-
century.7  Despite these notorious defects, however, the doctrine hangs 
on, seemingly impervious to outside criticism.  We suspect the reason 
largely arises from a sense that the connection between privacy and 
the Fourth Amendment is simply self-evident.  The test has its difficul-
ties, the thinking seems to be, but the inescapable truth is that privacy 
is the Fourth Amendment’s polestar.  How could things be otherwise? 
But they could be.  This Article challenges the foundations of the 
privacy-centered understanding, offering an alternative vision of the 
Fourth Amendment and a replacement for the reasonable expectation 
of privacy doctrine.  In bits and pieces, the approach we advocate has 
been kicking around in Fourth Amendment case law for some time, 
though it is also the subject of periodic judicial denunciations, emphat-
ic in tone if eventually disregarded.  It is a “positive law” model of the 
Fourth Amendment.8 
The mechanics of our proposal are easy to state.  Instead of making 
Fourth Amendment protection hinge on whether it is “reasonable” to 
expect privacy in a given situation, a court should ask whether gov-
ernment officials have engaged in an investigative act that would be 
unlawful for a similarly situated private actor to perform.  That is, 
stripped of official authority, has the government actor done something 
that would be tortious, criminal, or otherwise a violation of some legal 
duty?  Fourth Amendment protection, in other words, is warranted 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 270, at 94–95 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) (1953). 
 7 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of 
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998); 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 
(1974); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 
(1985); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 121 (2002); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-
Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011); Donald R.C. 
Pongrace, Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction: An Oppor-
tunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1985); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protec-
tion of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188–89; Jed Rubenfeld, The End 
of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2008); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The 
Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 28–29 (1988). 
 8 Our term is taken from Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 503, 516–19 (2007).  
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when government officials either violate generally applicable law or 
avail themselves of a governmental exemption from it. 
To see what this would mean, consider Katz v. United States,9 the 
landmark decision in which the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
was born.  The case concerned the bugging of a telephone booth10 used 
by a gambler named Charles Katz, accomplished by placing a micro-
phone atop the roof of the booth.  The government argued, among 
other things, that no search occurred because the microphones did not 
penetrate the inside of the phone booth.11  But the Supreme Court 
considered this irrelevant; the physical penetration argument assumed 
that the Fourth Amendment was tied to rules of property law, the 
Court reasoned, and such a property-based view should be rejected.12  
Instead, what mattered to the Court was whether the government had 
“violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied.”13  Or as 
Justice Harlan put it in a concurrence that has come to control, the 
question was whether someone in Katz’s position had an expectation 
not to be overheard that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reason-
able.’”14  As we have suggested, the question is deeply fraught. 
On our approach, the Court should instead have asked whether it 
was unlawful for an ordinary private actor to do what the govern-
ment’s agents did: install a listening device on the exterior of a private-
ly owned telephone booth and monitor conversations within.  The an-
swer to that question would have been: yes.  California law made it a 
criminal offense to “eavesdrop[] upon or record[] a confidential com-
munication” “by means of any electronic amplifying or recording de-
vice.”15  That alone should have made the bugging a search.  And this 
was only the most obvious prohibition that the agents’ conduct violat-
ed.  Notwithstanding the Court’s apparent sense that property law 
wasn’t up to the task, bugging the telephone booth — even from the 
outside — also very likely constituted a trespass under California 
law.16  Those legal prohibitions, rather than the reasonableness of any 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 10 Actually, two booths.  See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966). 
 11 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 12 Id. at 353. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 15 An Act to Add 653j to the Penal Code, Relating to the Overhearing and Recording of Com-
munications, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3871.  Section 653j, the provision applicable at the time of Katz, was 
augmented in 1967, shortly before the decision in the case was announced.  Incidentally, we note 
that while the 1963 statute exempted “law enforcement officers . . . doing that which they are oth-
erwise authorized by law to do,” id. at 3872, under our approach such government-specific exemp-
tions trigger the government-specific machinery of the Fourth Amendment. 
 16 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 159 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (stating that it is a 
trespass to attach an electric wire to another’s house); La Com v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 281 P.2d 
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claim to privacy, should have been the decisive considerations in de-
termining whether the government agents’ actions were regulated by 
the Fourth Amendment. 
In some scattered cases before and after Katz, the Court has re-
coiled from reliance on positive law.  It has, for example, insisted that 
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection is independent from “fine-
spun doctrines” of property and “the niceties of tort law.”17  It has 
likewise declared that “concepts of privacy under the laws of each 
State” do not “determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment.”18  It 
has said that trespass law cannot be the lodestar of Fourth Amend-
ment protection because it “furthers a range of interests that have 
nothing to do with privacy.”19  The Court has never really confronted 
the possibilities of positive law, however, because a comprehensive 
model of the Fourth Amendment grounded in positive law has never 
been set forth, much less defended. 
And despite its protestations, the Court cannot fully resist positive 
law’s allure.  In many cases it ends up looking to positive law consid-
erations after all, when ruling that the police can fly over one’s home, 
for instance, or when defining a “seizure” instead of a “search.”20  And 
in several recent opinions, Justice Scalia — twice speaking for the 
Court — tried to supplement the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
doctrine with a test based on property rights.21  These opinions contain 
fragments of the positive law model, but they are undertheorized and 
incomplete.22  This Article provides a coherent framework to under-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
894, 895 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (applying § 159); see also People v. Miller, 213 P.2d 534, 536 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (defining phone booth as a building for purposes of burglary). 
 17 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 752 (1952); see also Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms 
of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.”); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) 
(“[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the 
common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other 
branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.”). 
 18 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 44 (1988); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971). 
 19 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984).  The Court has occasionally made 
similar comments in cases dealing with the reasonableness requirement, see, e.g., Virginia v. 
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168–70 (2008), which is largely beyond our venture.  But see infra notes 189, 
194, 196, and accompanying text (discussing Moore).  
 20 See infra sections III.A, pp. 1867–69, III.C.3, pp. 1884–86. 
 21 See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137–38 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); Florida 
v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012);  
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 143 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For the difference between 
his theory and ours, see infra section I.B, pp. 1834–36. 
 22 For criticism of the Court’s use of the trespass test, see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of 
Fourth Amendment Searches, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 90–93 (2012); see also Laurent Sacharoff, 
Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 890–92 (2014) (noting uncertainty and inconsis-
tencies in the Court’s formulation); Brian Sawers, Original Misunderstandings: The Implications 
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stand these positive law instincts, one that is consistent with the histo-
ry and structure of the Constitution and that makes a great deal of 
sense as a matter of both first principles and practical realities. 
But what about privacy?23  Surely search-and-seizure law cannot 
really proceed without the concept of privacy to guide it?  We have 
two basic responses.  The first is that the Fourth Amendment is not 
primarily about privacy in the typical sense.  The great evil toward 
which it is directed is abuse of government power, not primarily the 
disclosure of personal secrets.  And the ideals that guide it are legality, 
the rule of law, and the public trust, not the notion of an irreducible 
sphere of confidential dealings.24  Second, however, while privacy is 
not the Fourth Amendment’s guiding light, the approach we outline 
nevertheless gives substantial protection to privacy interests because 
positive law itself does so.  Indeed, we believe the positive law model 
would prove a truer guardian of privacy than the Justices’ own opin-
ions about which expectations “society is prepared to recognize as  
reasonable.” 
This is the heart of our position, but the positive law approach is 
supported from many directions.  It is consistent with the treatment of 
similar issues of constitutional property under the Fifth Amendment 
and with historical practices regarding searches and seizures.  It re-
unites the law of searches with the law of seizures.  It protects the full 
range of interests and aims that positive law itself seeks to promote 
and shield, rather than privacy alone.  It is easier to administer, clear-
er, and more predictable.  It entails a form of analysis more appropri-
ate to the institutional capabilities of courts.  It harnesses the various 
strengths of legislatures and the benefits of federalism.  It provides for 
flexibility, adaptation, and experimentation, and establishes a better 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of Misreading History in Jones, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 474–82 (2015); David Steinberg, Flori-
da v. Jardines: Privacy, Trespass, and the Fourth Amendment, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 91, 
109–10 (2013). 
 23 See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183; CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE 
NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23–26 (2007); Sherry 
F. Colb, Correspondence, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of 
the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889, 903 (2004); David 
Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1074 (2014). 
 24 We are not alone in questioning the centrality of privacy to Fourth Amendment analysis.  
See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or 
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309 (1998); Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, 
and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 295 (1993); Paul Ohm, The 
Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1312 (2012); Rubenfeld, su-
pra note 7, at 117–18; William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 
YALE L.J. 393, 446 (1995).  But our solution is distinct.  See infra section II.E, pp. 1855–58 (dis-
cussing Ohm and Rubenfeld). 
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framework to analyze Fourth Amendment problems involving novel 
technologies. 
The time to consider the positive law model is now.  Dissatisfaction 
with the reasonable expectation of privacy formulation and the Court’s 
exposition of it has been particularly acute in recent cases involving 
the third-party doctrine.  Can it really be that the government can 
search any data that has hit a server or a cell tower, without ever trig-
gering Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as current third-party doctrine 
seems to suggest?  If not, how can judges tell which of the many dif-
ferent permutations of electronic transactions are covered by a “rea-
sonable expectation of privacy”?  Something must replace the third-
party doctrine.  This is it. 
Our discussion proceeds as follows.  In Part I, we give a more 
complete picture of the positive law model and of the ways it differs 
from what many, including the Supreme Court, associate with a  
property-based view of the Fourth Amendment.  In Part II, we lay out 
what we consider the overlapping justifications for the positive law 
model and attempt to anticipate some objections.  In Part III, we ex-
plore the implications for current law, with a particular focus on the 
third-party doctrine. 
I.  THE POSITIVE LAW MODEL 
A.  Mechanics 
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment declares inviolable “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”25  A two-step legal 
doctrine has grown from this guarantee.  A government agent must 
commit an act that can be characterized as either a search or a sei-
zure.26  If, but only if, this threshold requirement is met, the act is 
evaluated for its reasonableness — which in a wide set of cases re-
quires that a warrant satisfying various constitutional criteria be ob-
tained beforehand.  The search/seizure question therefore operates as 
the gateway to scrutiny of the government’s behavior, “defin[ing] the 
line between unregulated investigative steps that can be used at any 
time from special investigative steps that must be used only sparingly 
and in specific circumstances.”27 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 26 Kerr, supra note 8, at 528. 
 27 Id. at 508.  The amendment’s ambit is not limited to investigative steps, however, as is par-
ticularly obvious when it comes to protection against unreasonable seizures.  Cf. id. at 528 n.123. 
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Both the Katz test and our positive law test are concerned with this 
first stage of the Fourth Amendment analysis,28 the definition of 
“search” and “seizure.”  Like Katz, our primary focus is on the mean-
ing of searches, because that is the focus of current controversy and 
confusion.29  But unlike Katz, our model is equally applicable to both 
searches and seizures — a feature we consider an important 
strength — and we note that the law of seizures already resembles the 
positive law model, albeit imperfectly.30  Our approach can almost be 
seen as extending the analytical technique that governs seizures to 
searches. 
Textually, a search suggests an effort to glean information, though 
it isn’t hard to imagine a search whose purpose and effect is to harass 
or intimidate rather than to discover some unknown fact.  In any 
event, the range of investigatory acts that could conceivably fall within 
this concept is wide and the actual limits on the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment are uncertain.  Is it a search to eavesdrop on a conversa-
tion with a long-range microphone?31  Tap a phone line?32  Trick 
someone into revealing information?33  Examine the contents of a gar-
bage bag left on the street for pickup?34  Monitor the heat emitted 
from a person’s house from the street with a thermal-imaging de-
vice?35  Observe the activities in a person’s backyard from a helicop-
ter36 or airplane?37  Surreptitiously follow a car around in public?38  
Install a GPS tracking device on a car to monitor its movements?39  
Test the chemical composition of a substance?40  Use a trained dog to 
sniff out whether there are illegal drugs inside a suitcase,41 a car,42 or a 
house?43 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 We thus disagree with the proposal to use “state standards of private law” as a test for war-
rantless searches at the second stage, articulated in Note, The Fourth Amendment’s Third Way, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1633 (2007). 
 29 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.1(a), at 563 (5th ed. 2012) (“The word ‘seizures’ in the Fourth Amendment has, 
in the main, not been a source of difficulty.”). 
 30 See infra section III.C.3, pp. 1884–86. 
 31 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967).  
 32 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 33 See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 429–30, 437 (1963). 
 34 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 35 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 36 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 37 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 38 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 39 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
 40 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 41 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983). 
 42 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 43 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
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Katz instructs a court to resolve such questions by asking whether 
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” a person’s expecta-
tion to be free from such acts.44  That question, however, is ambiguous 
in critical respects and, if taken at face value, daunting to answer.45  
Consider thermal imaging.  Does the expectation of privacy at issue re-
fer to the facts that are likely to be revealed (the goings-on inside a 
private home) or the manner in which they are discovered (by someone 
standing in a public space)?  And regardless of such framing, what 
does society think about heat-detecting cameras?  Does it matter that 
what they ultimately reveal requires an inferential step, from heat to 
growing marijuana?  Does it matter that the information revealed is 
relatively limited?  Does it matter that such cameras are not in wide-
spread use?  Whether society is prepared to accept as reasonable a per-
son’s demand to be free of such monitoring is anybody’s guess.46 
Rather than this abstract exploration of sensibilities about the pri-
vacy of places or information, the positive law model focuses squarely 
on the government actors and their actions.  The question is: has a 
government actor done something that would be unlawful for a similar-
ly situated nongovernment actor to do?  Stated differently, the Fourth 
Amendment is triggered if the officer — stripped of official authori-
ty — could not lawfully act as he or she did.  Whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to detectives using a thermal-imaging camera to 
learn about what goes on inside a house, for example, would depend 
on whether an ordinary citizen would breach any sort of legal duty by 
attempting to do the same thing in the same circumstances. 
The positive law model is therefore triggered in two related situa-
tions: (1) those where a government actor has violated a law that ap-
plies to both government officials and private actors; and (2) those 
where a government official has taken advantage of an exception for 
government officials.  Though these paradigms are not precisely the 
same, both rely on positive law as the baseline for triggering Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny.  Treating them alike for Fourth Amendment 
purposes is consistent with the underlying theory of the positive law 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 45 See Kerr, supra note 8 (noting the many tools courts use to answer this question); see also 
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 113, 115 (2015) (arguing that “the scope of Katz is a normative question rather than a de-
scriptive claim about what people actually expect”). 
 46 We note the impressive efforts of one team to start answering such questions empirically 
through public opinion data.  See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Surveillance Du-
ration Doesn’t Affect Privacy Expectations: An Empirical Test of the Mosaic Theory, 2016 SUP. 
CT. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629373 [http://perma.cc/RHV6-ZBSR].  How-
ever, the project has not yet scaled up to match the country’s Fourth Amendment docket, though 
that may be the authors’ ultimate ambition.  See id. (manuscript at 27 n.136); see also infra notes 
154–155 and accompanying text. 
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model, as well as the simple reality that a distinction between immuni-
ty and lawbreaking may be academic when it is “law enforcement” 
that has broken the law. 
As we’ve said, the positive law model is a test only for the first step 
of the Fourth Amendment inquiry.  Once the Fourth Amendment is 
triggered, the search must still be “reasonable,” which under current 
law generally means that the government must obtain a warrant.  
There is a lively debate about the role of warrants under this second 
step.  Some scholars insist that the Fourth Amendment actually disfa-
vors warrants in most cases rather than requiring or preferring them,47 
while others defend current doctrine or argue that warrants should 
have an even greater constitutional role.48  Our model is agnostic 
about this debate.  We assume only that some form of serious, judicial 
scrutiny is required under the second step — whether it is a warrant, a 
revisionist reasonableness requirement, or something else.49 
Although the positive law model is generally quite straightforward, 
there are a few points to clarify.  First, when asking whether a private 
person could legally do what the government has done, we also include 
laws that force people to submit to the officer or take away rights of 
resistance or self-help without doing the same for private actors.  
Hence, it is a search if the government uses a special legal power to 
compel someone to disclose electronic documents stored on a cellphone 
or email account, even if the documents could have been disclosed 
consensually.50  The key is that the government is employing special 
legal powers beyond those conferred under generally applicable back-
ground law. 
Second, while positive law is the fulcrum of the search/seizure in-
quiry, it is not the only part.  A police officer who cheats on his income 
taxes does not thereby violate the Fourth Amendment.  As a textual 
matter, both the term “search” and the term “seizure” seem to imply a 
further limitation — otherwise there would be no difference between 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 771 (1994). 
 48 BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 201–05) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library); Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 9), h t t p : / / p a p e r s . s s r n . c o m / s o l 3 / p a p e r s . c f m 
 ? a b s t r a c t _ i d = 2 7 2 6 1 4 8  [http://perma.cc/Z2ND-M9T6]; see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the 
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 571–90 (1999) (criticizing Amar, supra note 
47, and TAYLOR, supra note 47). 
 49 Throughout this Article we thus take existing reasonableness doctrine for granted without 
passing judgment on this question.  And because the question of remedy is subsequent to reason-
ableness, we take existing remedies for granted as well.  
 50 See infra note 267–269 and accompanying text. 
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them.  A search requires an action generally likely to obtain infor-
mation,51 while a seizure requires an assertion of physical control.52 
Third, by “law,” we mean any prohibitory legal provisions, whether 
legislative, judicial, or administrative in origin, and whether classified 
as criminal or civil in nature.  We also incorporate all ordinary positive 
law rules of preemption, displacement, repeal, and so on.  And while 
we do think the law has to be violated in the course of the search or 
seizure (hence the income tax example above) we do not limit our-
selves to laws on any particular subject matter or legal interest.  Laws 
about trash that are designed to profit a waste-hauling monopoly are 
just as much a part of our model as laws about drones that are de-
signed to protect property or privacy rights.53 
Finally, we are inclined to accept the current assumption that 
searches and seizures include only intentional (and perhaps also reck-
less) acts.54  A police officer who accidentally collides with another car 
on the road would not commit a seizure, even if the accident would 
ordinarily constitute a tort.55  Intentionally running people off the 
road, on the other hand, would continue to be governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.56 
B.  Distinguishing the Trespass Theory 
Although the positive law model would reorient Fourth Amend-
ment law in fundamental ways, it does find support in aspects of cur-
rent doctrine.  Positive law has sometimes, if erratically, been invoked 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952–53, 953 n.8 (2012) (emphasizing “information-
gathering” trespasses); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that mere instal-
lation of a GPS tracking device on a car could not constitute a search if the device did not trans-
mit any data); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“[A] search ordinarily implies a quest by an 
officer of the law.”). 
  To be clear, a search does not require either that information actually be revealed or that the 
action be intended to uncover information, so long as the general character of the action is such 
that it would generally be likely to make public what had not been before.  It is still a search to 
open a legally protected filing cabinet even if the cabinet is bare. 
 52 These limits might seem to recall the underlying principles of privacy, liberty, and property 
that have been said to underlie the amendment under current doctrine.  See Soldal v. Cook Coun-
ty, 506 U.S. 56, 62–66 (1992). 
 53 See infra sections III.C.1–.2, pp. 1881–84, for these examples. 
 54 See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327, 333 (1986).  This is consistent with the interpretation of most constitutional rights, with pre-
vious Fourth Amendment decisions, with the general meaning of the words “search” and “seize,” 
and with the historical roots of search-and-seizure protection in the intentional torts of battery, 
trespass, and false imprisonment.  In the case of a search, this does not mean that a government 
agent necessarily acts with the intention of obtaining information, only that she intends to act in a 
way that has a search-like character. 
 55 Cf. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (“[I]f a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake and pins 
a passerby against a wall, it is likely that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 56 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
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in judicial determinations about what does and does not count as a 
search.57  Most significantly, several recent Supreme Court decisions 
have suggested something of a property renaissance in Fourth 
Amendment law, holding that even if property is not the touchstone of 
constitutional searches, it can still operate as a supplement to Katz.  It 
might seem that the positive law model we advocate is another way of 
describing this property-centered view of Fourth Amendment law.  In 
important ways, however, the reasoning in these property cases differs 
from what we advocate.  Understanding how helps illuminate the pos-
itive law model and suggests a better way to apply the Court’s core in-
sights in the property cases. 
The first example of the Court’s strong proprietary turn is United 
States v. Jones, which held that the surreptitious installation of a GPS 
tracking device on a car was a search.58  Justice Scalia’s opinion for 
the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects against 
trespass-like acts, that a physical intrusion was a trespass-like act, and 
that affixing the GPS device to the car was a physical intrusion.59  In 
the second property-ish case, Florida v. Jardines,60 the Court, again 
through the pen of Justice Scalia, concluded that a search occurred 
when a police officer entered the front porch of a Florida house with a 
drug-sniffing dog, Franky,61 and used the dog to detect drugs within.62  
This was so even though precedent already provided that police can 
generally walk up to one’s front door63 and that dog sniffs are not 
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.64  According 
to the Court, the key was the physical intrusion onto the homeowner’s 
property without permission: while the public may generally have an 
“implied license” to come onto one’s porch for neighborly purposes, the 
license did not extend to poking around with a dog.65 
While we applaud Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for the role of prop-
erty, and we think this line of cases might one day blossom into the 
positive law model, we would refine his approach in several key re-
spects.  First, Justice Scalia implicitly limited his analysis to property 
law concepts, rather than positive law more generally.  Including posi-
tive law may well grant additional protection against invasions of  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 57 See infra section III.A, pp. 1867–71; Kerr, supra note 8, at 516–19. 
 58 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 59 Id. at 949–53. 
 60 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 61 Id. at 1420 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 62 Id. at 1413 (majority opinion). 
 63 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011). 
 64 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005). 
 65 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–17. 
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privacy, as well as protection against stalking, harassment, and so on.66  
This was important in Jones because, as Justice Alito noted in a sepa-
rate concurrence, it wasn’t simply the installation of the tracking de-
vice but also the use of the information received from it that was chal-
lenged,67 and the tort of trespass might not be as well suited as other 
bodies of law to address questions involving the use of information.  
Similarly, in Jardines, the majority enmeshed itself in hypotheses about 
the scope of implied consent to enter property that anyone may ordi-
narily enter.68  Again, other bodies of positive law might be better suit-
ed to address whether strangers can come on to your porch to try to 
find out what you’re doing inside.69 
Second, Justice Scalia wasn’t interested in property law as actual 
law but rather as a source of analogies.  His opinions treated the 
Fourth Amendment as borrowing the general look and feel of 
trespassory actions, not as formally incorporating the background law 
of property.  In Jones, he conceptualized trespass law in a sort of ideal-
ized form rather than in terms of the positive law of a specific jurisdic-
tion, with all its particularities.70  At no point did he cite any statutes 
or judicial decisions from Maryland, the place where the GPS device 
was installed.  Justice Scalia also appeared to conceive of that law as it 
was manifest at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, rather 
than as it operates today.71  This tendency was even more pronounced 
in Jardines, which avoided using the term “trespass” altogether and in-
stead spoke only of “physical intrusion,” putting further distance  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 66 See, e.g., Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1986). 
 67 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 68 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416–17; cf. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co. v. Carter, 108 So. 815, 819 
(Fla. 1926) (discussing implied licenses under Florida law). 
 69 See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1252 
n.20 (Fla. 1996) (invasion of privacy); Goosen v. Walker, 714 So. 2d 1149, 1149–50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1998) (stalking). 
 70 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50; see also Sacharoff, supra note 22, at 891 (praising this idealized 
approach). 
 71 There is some ambiguity on this point.  Justice Scalia objected to the charge that he relied 
on “18th-century tort law,” but he did so by arguing that the Fourth Amendment “must provide at 
a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted,” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953, 
and elsewhere the Court said that “[w]e have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have 
been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted,” 
id. at 949.  Still, some have read the opinion as relying on something more like what we propose.  
See Sacharoff, supra note 22, at 891 (“Jones seems to envision a trespass test based upon contem-
porary state law trespass principles.”).  In his dissent in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), 
Justice Scalia may have come closer to the mark, arguing that “if the matter did depend solely on 
property rights, a latter-day alteration of property rights would also produce a latter-day altera-
tion of the Fourth Amendment outcome — without altering the Fourth Amendment itself.”  Id. at 
143 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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between the property-ish analogy and actual positive law.72  As in 
Jones, the Jardines Court did not consult local law (here, Florida) on 
implied licenses, instead reasoning in the abstract about an assumed 
set of rules on the subject that “does not require fine-grained legal 
knowledge.”73  By contrast, the positive law approach we advocate 
would have required the Court to look at the law of Maryland as of 
the time the GPS device was installed and used and the law of Florida 
as of the time that Franky sniffed around the porch.  The critical ques-
tion is whether the officials in question were doing something that or-
dinary people would have gotten into legal trouble for doing in like 
circumstances. 
Ultimately, the view of Fourth Amendment law described in cases 
like Jones and Jardines seems — at least so far — to treat property 
concepts as a useful proxy for the privacy interests identified in Katz.  
For that reason, it operates as a sidecar to Katz, enlarging the scope of 
protection or, perhaps, merely simplifying the Katz inquiry in certain 
cases by means of a per se rule.  The positive law model, however, is 
not primarily a supplement or a shortcut to the Katzian expectation of 
privacy.74  To be sure, the positive law model does ultimately result in 
a significant measure of individual privacy.  But it does not look to 
positive law because doing so fosters privacy; it fosters privacy because 
privacy protection is a consequence of looking to positive law. 
II.  THE CASES FOR THE POSITIVE LAW MODEL 
Using positive law to trigger Fourth Amendment protection has 
deep roots in several different ways of thinking about the Fourth 
Amendment.  We won’t spend much time on the text itself, which 
seems to us susceptible of quite a few constructions.  The ordinary 
meanings of “searches” and “seizures” do not seem to refer to positive 
law, but then again, in everyday usage, they do not naturally extend to, 
say, wiretapping or to shooting someone.  As they are used in the 
Fourth Amendment, the words function as terms of art, with a par-
ticularly legal flavor.75  This isn’t in the least unusual.  Whether prop-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415, 1417; see also Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Andrew Tutt, Offensive 
Searches, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2–3), http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2739453 [http://perma.cc/6TBE-56H6] (arguing that “intrusions” 
in Jardines and Jones should not be understood as violations of positive law but rather as “gov-
ernment action that would be highly offensive or degrading to a reasonable person,” id. (manu-
script at 1)). 
 73 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415; see id. at 1415–17. 
 74 But see Kerr, supra note 8, at 532–34 (describing the positive law model as a proxy for pri-
vacy); Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside 
the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 283–85, 298–99 (1993) (same). 
 75 THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION § 1.2.1.1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 2014); id. § 1.2.1.1.2, at 5–7 (defining seizures of per-
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erty is “taken” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, for in-
stance, depends on whether there has been a curtailment of a property 
holder’s legal rights, not whether anything has physically changed 
hands.76  In important respects, moreover, this interpretation is con-
sistent with the history of the Fourth Amendment. 
We will therefore begin with the theoretical basis for the positive 
law model as a matter of history, constitutional structure, and a gen-
eral normative commitment to an ideal of legality.  We will then turn 
to its more practical advantages, before responding to potential  
objections. 
A.  History 
The positive law model finds strong support in the historical back-
ground of the Fourth Amendment, which emphasized both property 
and positive law more generally.  The story is oft-told so we will re-
count the key points only briefly. 
One key incident was colonial rebellion against the abuses of cus-
toms officials in the colonies.  Officials were at first known “to enter 
buildings forcibly by the mere authority of their commissions as offic-
ers.”77  Later, this privilege was reinforced by a “writ of assistance,” 
which gave “a continuous license and authority” to break and enter 
“wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to be.”78  While they took 
various legal forms, writs of assistance gave customs officials a sweep-
ing legal privilege.79 
That privilege was, to say the least, controversial.  The legitimacy 
and legality of the writs were attacked most famously in Massachu-
setts court by James Otis, who argued that the “writ, if it should be 
declared legal, would totally annihilate” the “freedom of one’s own 
house.”80  Otis later presented an official complaint on behalf of the 
inhabitants of Boston that amplified the egregiousness of the privilege: 
“These Officers may under color of Law and the cloak of a general 
warrant, break through the sacred Rights of the Domicil, ransack 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
sons and property).  Professor Thomas Clancy also suggests an alternate textual basis for the 
first-stage search/seizure inquiry, namely “The Right to Be ‘Secure.’”  Id. § 3, at 78–159. 
 76 Of course, where physical movement entails a curtailment of property rights akin to taking 
“full title,” takings protection is triggered.  See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 
(2015) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 431 (1982)); see 
also id. (treating personal property “held ‘for the account’ of the Government” as equivalent to 
personal property physically transferred to it (quoting 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(a) (2015))). 
 77 NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 55 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1937). 
 78 Id. at 54.  
 79 Writs of assistance were variously authorized by both executive and legislative action.  See 
CLANCY, supra note 75, § 2.2.3, at 47–48, 51. 
 80 Speech of James Otis, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, app. A, 523, 524 (Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co. 1850). 
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Mens Houses, destroy their Securities, carry off their Property, and 
with little Danger to themselves commit the most horrid Murders.”81 
Otis’s arguments were widely repeated throughout the colonies.82  
And they indirectly inspired the Fourth Amendment: They made a 
particularly strong impression on a young John Adams,83 who went on 
to draft the Massachusetts Constitution.84  Massachusetts’s search-
and-seizure provision was in turn copied into the federal Constitution’s 
Fourth Amendment.85 
The other key sources used to understand the Fourth Amendment 
are the English cases of Wilkes v. Wood86 and Entick v. Carrington.87  
In those cases, the English government sent messengers, under author-
ity of a warrant, to enter Wilkes’s and Entick’s homes looking for evi-
dence of sedition and ultimately arrest them and confiscate their pa-
pers.  Each of them sued and prevailed before the English courts.  
Chief Justice Pratt condemned the Wilkes search as “totally subversive 
of the liberty of the subject” and likely to “affect the person and prop-
erty of every man in this kingdom.”88  His condemnation of the Entick 
search was similarly emphatic.  This power to search would “destroy 
all the comforts of society; for papers are often the dearest property a 
man can have.”89  Both incidents were discussed in America and are 
widely thought to have played a pivotal role in the drafting of the 
Fourth Amendment.90 
Each of these incidents points to a positive law baseline for the 
Fourth Amendment.  Put aside the reasons that these searches and sei-
zures were ultimately thought illegal, which go to the question of rea-
sonableness — the second step of the Fourth Amendment analysis.  
When we look at the nature of the harm or intrusion, the first-step 
question, each event stresses property.  Otis pointed to “the privilege of 
House” and invoked the maxim that “[a] man’s house is his castle.”91  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 81 Report of the Committee of Boston on Rights of Colonists (1772), as published by Order of 
the Town, 15–17, reprinted in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND 
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, app. 1, at 466–67 (Boston, Little, Brown & 
Co. 1865);  see also id. at 466 (noting that this argument is “so curiously like Otis’s argument upon 
the Writs of Assistance in 1761”). 
 82 See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL 
MEANING 602–1791, at 396 (2009). 
 83 LASSON, supra note 77, at 60–61. 
 84 CLANCY, supra note 75, § 2.2.3.3, at 57 & n.101.  
 85 Id. § 2.4, at 70–71 (noting that while the federal Constitution’s warrant requirements dif-
fered from Massachusetts’s, the scope of protection was “copied almost verbatim,” id. at 70). 
 86 (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.). 
 87 (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). 
 88 Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498. 
 89 Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817–18. 
 90 See CLANCY, supra note 75, § 2.2.3.2, at 51–52, 55. 
 91 Speech of James Otis, supra note 80, at 522, 524. 
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The opinion in Wilkes defended “the person and property of every 
man.”92  And Entick intoned that “[t]he great end, for which men en-
tered into society, was to secure their property,” and specifically em-
phasized that to justify a search required one to justify “a trespass” by 
looking to “positive law.”93  Indeed, these episodes have contributed to 
a longstanding conventional wisdom that until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, trespass was the central test for a Fourth Amendment search.94 
The positive law model does not stop at the law of property, how-
ever, and neither did this history, though this part of the story is fre-
quently overlooked.  Wilkes (and the printers arrested along with him) 
had sued not just for a property violation but also for false imprison-
ment.95  Other suits similarly challenged searches and seizures as false 
imprisonment or other violations of what would today be thought of as 
torts relating to personal security.96  Of course we do not know exactly 
how far this went, or more accurately, would have gone.97  We cannot 
say for sure whether the same Founding-era principles would apply to 
a suit for, say, “intrusion upon seclusion” because no such right of ac-
tion was then recognized.98  But the history is at least suggestive, and 
the most straightforward extrapolation is that the search-and-seizure 
principle — the idea that some actions by government officials raised 
questions demanding judicial scrutiny — was marked by violations of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498. 
 93 These passages come from the longer report of Entick in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s 
State Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765), which may have been less widely available before ratification 
of the Fourth Amendment.  See Davies, supra note 48, at 566 n.25.  A briefer and less florid ver-
sion appears in the English Reports, Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817–18. 
 94 Cf. Kerr, supra note 22, at 67–68 (attempting to debunk this conventional wisdom).  We ex-
plain our own quibbles with this “trespass” test supra section I.B, pp. 1833–36. 
 95 Money v. Leach, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1075 (K.B.) (printer’s suit for “imprisoning 
him”); Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768 (K.B.) (journeyman printer’s suit for “im-
prisonment”).  How much of Wilkes’s verdict turned on false imprisonment is a little less clear.  
Compare CLANCY, supra note 75, § 2.2.3.2, at 52 (claiming that Wilkes separately sued “for false 
imprisonment”), with CUDDIHY, supra note 82, at 447 (noting that, unlike Leach and Huckle, the 
“damnation of general warrants” in Wilkes “emphasized their search, not their arrest, side”).  
 96 See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 82, at 593 (English cases); TAYLOR, supra note 47, at 188 
n.71 (nineteenth-century American cases, which were “[c]ommonly . . . trespass suits,” id. at 44); 
see also Ex parte Watkins 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.) (remarking that if some-
one is imprisoned under a judgment that proves to “be a nullity, the officer who obeys it is guilty 
of false imprisonment”); cf. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768 (“[T]orts or injuries which may be done 
by one man to another are infinite[:] . . . cases of criminal conversation, battery, imprisonment, 
slander, malicious prosecutions . . . .”). 
 97 Kerr, supra note 22, at 72–73 (noting that “home entries and rummaging around inside were 
understood as the paradigmatic examples of ‘searches’” but arguing that “[e]xamples alone cannot 
identify how far beyond their facts the principle should extend”). 
 98 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960), dates the tort’s origins to De 
May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).  Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2040 (2010) (“[A]s a historical matter the Fourth Amendment’s enactment 
preceded the Warren and Brandeis privacy revolution.”). 
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positive law, and moreover, by violations extending beyond the law of 
property. 
The positive law connection is further illustrated by the original 
remedial structure of the Fourth Amendment.  At the time it was rati-
fied, the only way to enforce rights against unlawful searches and sei-
zures was through private law remedies, such as the trespass and false 
imprisonment actions noted above.  Modern remedies like the exclu-
sion of evidence and the § 1983 or Bivens lawsuit did not exist.99  In-
stead, the process of vindicating Fourth Amendment rights began by 
alleging that a government official had violated a legal duty arising 
out of general law.  The official would then attempt to invoke official 
immunity as a defense, and this could then be challenged on grounds 
that the officer had acted unreasonably.100 
We note three key features of this remedial structure.  First, the 
positive law inquiry operated at a threshold level, by providing the 
cause of action.  It may not have been necessary to specifically label 
that positive law inquiry a question of “search” or “seizure” because 
the positive law claim was a necessary and sufficient condition for 
hauling an officer into court and forcing him to invoke an official de-
fense.101  Analogously, under our model, the positive law violation is 
the threshold question that triggers the reasonableness requirement.  
(As we discuss later, we don’t think the positive law model has to stick 
to positive law causes of action in particular,102 but the structure of the 
inquiry matches our vision.) 
Second, we note the absence of any known historical instance of 
people complaining about a Fourth Amendment violation that was not 
also a positive law violation.  For instance, although the enforcement 
of Fourth Amendment rights depended on positive law suits — again, 
the modern remedies were not yet available — there was none of to-
day’s angst about the poverty of remedies for Fourth Amendment  
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 99 See United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843–44 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551); see also Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 1885, 1919–20 (2014). 
 100 See BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 33 (1986); Amar, 
supra note 47, at 785–86; Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1132 
(1969). 
 101 Cf. Re, supra note 99, at 1920 (“[T]he original trespass-oriented remedial scheme was intui-
tive given the eighteenth-century premise that officers should be treated as private parties.  Origi-
nally, the Fourth Amendment did not impose special constraints on government agents as such.  
Rather, it ensured that ‘unreasonable’ federal officials would be treated just like private common 
law trespassers.” (footnote omitted)). 
 102 See infra section III.B.3, pp. 1880–81. 
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violations.103  That is suggestive, though far from conclusive, that the 
positive law was a threshold test under the Fourth Amendment itself. 
Finally, the original contours of search-and-seizure protection may 
be even easier to see when we recall that until Reconstruction, the 
Fourth Amendment applied only to federal action.  Meanwhile, most 
of the relevant positive law rights and remedies needed to enforce 
search-and-seizure protection were created by state law.  This struc-
ture enabled states to define positive law entitlements broadly in order 
to guard against abuses of their citizens by federal agents.  Without the 
Fourth Amendment, however, the Supremacy Clause would normally 
have allowed the federal government to authorize federal agents to ig-
nore state law.104  By constraining such authorizations, the Fourth 
Amendment preserved a central role for states in defining the ambit of 
protection against abuses by federal officials.  The positive law model 
thus fulfilled James Madison’s promise that “[t]he different govern-
ments will control each other”105 through a federalist structure of 
rights enforcement.106 
Again, we don’t claim that the positive law model was ever articu-
lated in exactly these terms at the time.  It may not have been neces-
sary to articulate it, since the role of positive law remedies could be 
taken for granted.  But after a century of failed experimentation with 
other models, the time has come to consider just what it would mean 
and whether it is compatible with the history leading up to the Fourth 
Amendment’s adoption. 
B.  Structure 
It is somehow often forgotten that the Fourth Amendment governs 
both searches and seizures, and the two are often treated quite differ-
ently.  The positive law model unifies the treatment of searches and 
seizures and helps to explain why the Fourth Amendment lumps them 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 103 See WILSON, supra note 100, at 16 (“For the Fourth Amendment to be law in the full sense, 
it must be understood as requiring an available remedy for violation of the asserted right.  The 
framers assumed that this demand was met by the remedial aspect of the common law . . . .”). 
 104 At least if combined with a capacious understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).  The 
citation is to the second printing, headed “Gales & Seaton’s History of Debates in Congress.”  See 
William Baude & Jud Campbell, Early American Constitutional History: A Source Guide 10–11 
(Feb. 29, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), h t t p : / / p a p e r s . s s r n . c o m / s o l 3 / p a p e r s . c f m ? a b s t r a c t _ i d 
=2718777 [http://perma.cc/F327-X6YT] (describing the confusion over different paginations of 
the Annals). 
 105 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 106 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1493–95, 1506–09 
(1987); see also William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 
1738, 1823 (2013).  See generally Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth 
Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 1263–87 (2015) (arguing that state law was originally under-
stood to be integral to the Bill of Rights). 
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together.107  This too is more consistent with the historical background 
of the Fourth Amendment, which tended to view searches and seizures 
as more closely linked phenomena.  While modern Fourth Amendment 
law primarily deals with searches and, to a lesser extent, seizures of 
persons, much of the concern at the time of its ratification centered on 
seizures of goods, with searches coming into play because of their role 
in facilitating seizures.  The paradigmatic Fourth Amendment actor at 
the time of ratification was the customs collector, not the police detec-
tive.  Indeed, the modern, professional police force was unknown at 
the time of the Founding, and even after its establishment, investiga-
tive searches subject to the Fourth Amendment were restricted by the 
so-called mere evidence rule, which categorically circumscribed the 
power to search.108  Katz’s vision of the Fourth Amendment not only 
shifts the spotlight to searches but treats them as phenomena unrelated 
to seizures, governed by an entirely separate doctrine.  The positive 
law model realigns these twin pillars of the Fourth Amendment, bring-
ing theoretical coherence to Fourth Amendment law as a whole. 
The positive law model also has a strong connection to the ap-
proach used to protect property under the neighboring Fifth Amend-
ment,109 which prohibits deprivations of property without due process 
of law and the taking of property without just compensation.110  While 
the Fourth Amendment does not talk about property in so many 
words, some of its language (“houses,” “effects,” and especially “their”) 
obviously evokes property, and we do not think it is a coincidence that 
it has a long history of focusing on property.  In any event, at least 
three major features of constitutional property doctrines parallel the 
positive law approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
First, and most tellingly, the property rights protected by the Fifth 
Amendment are defined by extrinsic sources of positive law, typically 
state law, rather than by the Constitution itself.111  Constitutional 
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 107 Cf. Sacharoff, supra note 22, at 894–95 ( “[T]he trespass concept can help unify searches and 
seizures to remind us that many of the harms the Fourth Amendment protects against apply 
equally to both types of conduct.”). 
 108 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921); see also CLANCY, supra note 75, 
§ 3.2.1, at 85. 
 109 And while we almost hate to mention it at the risk of being thought to joke, the other 
neighboring amendment, the Third, shares similar themes.  It prohibits the wartime quartering of 
soldiers “in any house” other than “in a manner to be prescribed by law,” as well as the quartering 
in times of peace in any manner unless the consent of the owner is obtained.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
III.  It both piggybacks on property and stresses the importance of legality more generally. 
 110 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 111 James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 286 (2013) (“[I]t is black 
letter law that ‘the Constitution protects rather than creates property interests,’ and that whether 
a person has a property right protected by the Constitution ‘is determined by reference to existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” (quoting  
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998))). 
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property clauses could generate their own law of property, recognizing 
rights against government interference broader than the background 
law of property.  They could, in other words, do what Katz does in 
creating a separate law of privacy applicable to government officials, 
distinct from the privacy rules governing everyone else.  But they do 
not.  Neither, we add, is the property protected by the Due Process and 
Takings Clauses defined by the property law of the Founding era112 
but rather by modern law, which recognizes property in intangibles 
like trade secrets,113 bank accounts,114 and even welfare benefits.115  
These doctrines show that it is possible to bottom constitutional rights 
on ordinary positive law, and that this is indeed the chosen approach 
when it comes to other related areas of constitutional law. 
A second parallel feature of constitutional property doctrines is the 
generous view of what counts as “property.”  When looking to back-
ground positive law, what matters is the structure of the right, not the 
label that positive law affixes to it.  In other words, it doesn’t matter 
whether background law uses the word “property” to describe the 
right — if it looks like a property right, smells like a property right, 
and acts like a property right, it is constitutional property, even if the 
state or federal law establishing it uses a different word.116  This 
makes conceptual sense: as one of us has argued, all legal rights can be 
thought of as “things” that are owned by their holders.117  It is also 
consistent with the views of the Founders such as James Madison, who 
drafted the original text of the Fourth Amendment (and originally in-
cluded in it an explicit reference to property118).  Madison wrote that 
in its “larger and juster meaning,” property “embraces every thing to 
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 112 But cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (“What we apply [when interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment] is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which 
we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was  
adopted.”). 
 113 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 114 See, e.g., Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164–71; Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U.S. 155, 160–61 (1980). 
 115 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); accord Stern, supra note 111, at 323–25. 
 116 Stern, supra note 111, at 286–87; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitu-
tional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 952–54 (2000). 
 117 See Stern, supra note 111, at 303–04; see also JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 75 
(1973) (“Rights are themselves property, things we own . . . .”); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natu-
ral Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 182 (1955) (“Rights are typically conceived of as possessed or 
owned by or belonging to individuals, and these expressions reflect the conception of moral rules 
as not only prescribing conduct but as forming a kind of moral property of individuals to which 
they are as individuals entitled . . . .”).  We note that if we thought Justice Scalia had used proper-
ty in this capacious sense in Jones and Jardines, we would have one fewer quarrel with him. 
 118 James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), 
in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 437, 443 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (“The rights of the people 
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property from all unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to 
every one else the like advantage.”119  Thus, “as a man is said to have 
a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his 
rights.”120  In short, even if we think of the Fourth Amendment as 
originally concerned with property rights, those rights may generalize 
to include modern positive law, such as those designed to protect inter-
ests in personal privacy. 
The third point of similarity lies in the general constitutional vision 
the property clauses reflect and the way they enforce it.  The Takings 
and Due Process Clauses both recognize that public officials will have 
special legal powers private parties lack, but seek to tame and disci-
pline the exercise of those powers in ways that reduce the gap between 
government and governed.  The Takings Clause requires compensation 
where positive law rights of property are abrogated.121  The Due Pro-
cess Clause requires that government act according to law,122 follow 
appropriately particularized procedures,123 and, at least since Carolene 
Products, supply adequate reasons for its policies and actions.124   
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 119 James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in MADISON, supra 
note 118, at 515, 515 (emphasis omitted). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 346 (2000).  Although compensation suggests undo-
ing the harm of a taking and restoring owners to their “rightful position,” see DOUGLAS 
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 16 (3d ed. 2002), the compensation norm isn’t as 
stringently applied in the context of takings as it might be.  See, e.g., Patrick Luff, The Market 
Value Rule of Damages and the Death of Irreparable Injury, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 361, 367–68 
(2011).  
  In addition to just compensation, the Takings Clause has also been held to require a “public 
use,” which can be seen as another requirement of reason-giving.  Cf. William Baude, Takings 
Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 444, 446 (David F. Forte &  
Matthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014) (“As a purely textual matter, the clause is ambiguous about 
such a requirement.  It is possible to read the clause as simply describing the conditions under 
which property will be taken. . . . The conventional reading of the Takings Clause, however, in-
fers an independent public use requirement.”). 
 122 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 95–98; John 
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1453 (1992); 
Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 983, 985 (2006); James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1536 (2008); see also Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the 
Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1680–81 (1987). 
 123 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Londoner v. City & County of  
Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908); see also Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Es-
say, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1773–77 (2012). 
 124 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[A] statute would deny due 
process which precluded the disproof in judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or 
tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a rational basis.”).  
In the mine-run of cases, this last requirement is weak-to-nonexistent.  See Williamson v. Lee  
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).  Something similar may be true for the public use doc-
trine under the Takings Clause.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490–91 (2005) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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These provisions employ rules of legality, process, and reason-giving to 
curb the exercise of the government’s extraordinary powers.  The 
Fourth Amendment’s own second stage operates similarly and re-
sponds to the same underlying concern about the government’s special 
power to step outside the law. 
C.  Legality and Government Power 
It is a basic and inevitable fact about government that it has spe-
cial legal powers that private parties do not.  Those powers pose risks.  
And those risks are why our constitutional system subjects the gov-
ernment to restrictions that it does not impose on private parties.  That 
is the reason the Fourth Amendment is especially concerned with the 
areas where the government claims the special authority to transcend 
the law.  In the rather stirring words of Justice Brandeis: 
  Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials 
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen.  In a government of laws, existence of the government will be im-
perilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. . . . To declare that in 
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to 
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution.  
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.125 
The basic premise of our constitutional order is that government 
presents special dangers because it wields special powers, in particular 
the ability to use physical force to coerce action.  Concern about the 
dangers associated with this special power is a pervasive theme in the 
Constitution, and understandably so for “[t]he power of the state is an 
awesome thing.”126  The ability to use force is not only the ability to 
harm in the most direct and palpable sense but also the ability to co-
erce behavior by threatening harm.  For this reason, the Constitution 
imposes numerous restrictions on actions by government that it does 
not impose on private actors, a principle reflected in the so-called state 
action doctrine.127 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 125 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also 
NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF TITUS LIVIUS 229 
(Christian E. Detmold trans.), reprinted in THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES (Random 
House, Inc. 1950) (1513) (“[T]here can be no worse example in a republic than to make a law and 
not to observe it; the more so when it is disregarded by the very parties who made it.”). 
 126 Lillian R. BeVier, Law, Economics, and the Power of the State, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 5, 6 (1997). 
 127 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507 (1985) (“It is 
firmly established that the Constitution applies only to governmental conduct, usually referred to 
as ‘state action.’”); see also Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1063, 1076–77 (2000) (arguing that the “state action doctrine reflects a normative political 
theory that our judges attribute to the Constitution,” which reflects perceptions that, among other 
things, “the state’s monopoly of lawful force, its unique powers of lawful, direct coercion of per-
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Granting an entity with the power of coercive force privileges ex-
empting it from ordinary law is therefore a cause for serious apprehen-
sion.  Beyond the specific history of the Constitution itself, a wide 
range of theorists — including Locke and Hayek — have argued that 
subjecting government officials to the laws they enact is essential to 
curbing abuses of governmental power.128  For one thing, exemptions 
from law can encourage a more general sense of privilege in govern-
ment officials, making them “licentious by Impunity,” in Locke’s 
phrase, and unwilling to obey whatever other constraints supposedly 
bind them.129  For another, exemptions enable officials to impose bur-
dens on others without experiencing the effect of those burdens on 
themselves and can therefore make officials more willing to impose 
onerous and unjustified constraints.  James Madison argued that the 
Constitution implicitly proscribed general exemptions from the law for 
government officials, declaring such a limitation “one of the strongest 
bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people 
together.”130  Thomas Jefferson imagined that the narrow scope of leg-
islative privilege granted Congress by the Constitution reflected the 
Framers’ view of the “encroaching character of privilege” and their 
“care to provide that the laws shall bind equally on all, and especially 
that those who make them shall not exempt themselves from their  
operation.”131 
More generally, exemptions from general law stand in tension with 
liberal notions of political equality and ordered liberty, opening the 
door to government characterized by ruling-class privilege and un-
bounded sovereign will.  Justice Brandeis went so far as to declare that 
“the principle which denies to government officials an exceptional po-
sition before the law and which subjects them to the same rules of 
conduct that are commands to the citizen” lies “[a]t the foundation of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
sons, make it (most definitely) a power-source to be feared” and that “incumbent state officials are 
exposed to a constant temptation to direct their special powers toward establishing and maintain-
ing their own dominance”). 
 128 See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 155 (Henry Regnery Co. 1972) 
(1960) (“The chief safeguard is that the rules must apply to those who lay them down and those 
who apply them — that is, to the government as well as the governed — and that nobody has the 
power to grant exceptions.”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 326–28 (Peter 
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see also Jeremy Waldron, One Law for All? The 
Logic of Cultural Accommodation, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 3 (2002) (“We value this generality 
not least as a bulwark against oppression.  We figure that we are less likely to get oppressive laws 
when the lawmakers are bound by the same rules they lay down for everyone else.”). 
 129 LOCKE, supra note 128, at 328. 
 130 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 131 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the Senate of 
the United States, in JEFFERSON’S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 359 (Wilbur Samuel Howell 
ed., 1988) (2d ed. 1812). 
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our civil liberty.”132  Indeed, the very term “rule of law” was coined by 
A.V. Dicey to capture the idea of a political system in which “no man 
is above the law,”133 meaning in particular that it “excludes the idea of 
any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the 
law which governs other citizens.”134  To place officials above the law 
would be to subvert this fundamental principle of political liberty. 
These are all ways in which any sort of exemption from law might 
be associated with abuse of power by government officials.  But there 
is an even more basic connection between exemptions from the law 
and the government’s coercive powers.  The government’s coercive 
powers are themselves the central manifestation of immunity from 
general law.  The government’s operational monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force arises precisely because the government is not constrained 
by laws that govern everyone else.135  The two phenomena aren’t 
merely related; in the most important cases, they are identical.136  The 
government’s basic coercive powers consist of the authority to perform 
acts that otherwise make up the everyday stuff of criminal and tort 
law: trespass, robbery, battery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, mur-
der, extortion, and assault.137  In the Constitution’s theoretical frame-
work, the reason the government is a source of particular dangers is 
precisely because of the special powers that result from its exemption 
from general law.  Exemptions are what define the state, exemptions 
are what justify the state, and exemptions are what make the state 
dangerous. 
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 132 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 133 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
189 (6th ed. 1902). 
 134 Id. at 198. 
 135 In this sense, we refer not to the government’s power to determine when force may be used, 
which might allow it to permit the use of force by others so long as that use is on the govern-
ment’s terms, but to the functional monopoly characteristic of modern states wherein only its 
agents are permitted to use force. 
 136 In a thorough and sensitive examination of issues involving private security services,  
Professor David Sklansky suggests the differences between members of public police forces and 
others are a matter less of formal powers and more of social understanding and the remedies that 
attach to misconduct.  David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999).  He 
acknowledges, however, that “[t]he public police obviously have some well-defined powers that 
private security personnel lack,” which “is particularly true with regard to searches.”  Id. at 1187.  
We think he may understate the effect of these formal distinctions.  At the same time, we are not 
necessarily averse to including some measure of what might be considered “de facto law” in the 
Fourth Amendment analysis, though for reasons of administrative complexity, we are unsure 
about proceeding in this direction.  Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601–03 (1972) (finding 
that informal understandings may create legal entitlements constituting property for due process 
purposes); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162–69 (1970) (allowing a constitutional suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for state-enforced “custom having the force of law,” id. at 169). 
 137 See LAWRENCE KRADER, FORMATION OF THE STATE 21 (1968). 
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No less close is the connection between governmental exemptions 
and search-and-seizure protections.  The paradigmatic examples of 
searches and seizures concern the very immunities and powers that 
constitute the government’s monopoly on the use of coercive force.  As 
Professors Lillian BeVier and John Harrison write: 
Under the sub-constitutional law that protects private property, people are 
not free to enter another’s home, or physically seize another’s person, 
without permission.  As a result, it is much easier for people to keep se-
crets from one another than it otherwise would be.  But governments rou-
tinely authorize their agents to search for evidence of wrongdoing in ways 
that would be unlawful for a private person.  Search warrants are a classic 
example; they empower officers to use physical force, if necessary, to enter 
private property without the owner’s permission.  Warrants, and other 
sources of special authority to search, thus present a threat to rights-
holders that the private law does not deal with because it does not apply 
to the government as it does to others.  The Fourth Amendment adds an 
additional layer of rules that the ordinary legislative process may not al-
ter — rules designed specifically for the special search and seizure powers 
of officials.  It does permit searches that a private person could never un-
dertake, but requires that they be reasonable.  It does allow the special ex-
ception to private rights created by warrants but regulates their issuance 
and content.138 
In other words, the government presents special concerns, because 
it need not follow the same restrictions applicable to everyone else, and 
in particular, because it may probe, restrain, and carry off people and 
resources in ways that would be illegal for others.  An understanding 
of the Fourth Amendment centered on exemptions from general law 
captures the cases in which the government’s monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of force comes into play.139  In other words, it targets the 
hallmark attribute of the state’s “stateness” and the source of the par-
ticular dangers it poses.140  It focuses the Fourth Amendment on what 
is distinctive about the government and what is distinctly dangerous 
about it. 
The significance of governmental exemptions in rendering the state 
dangerous and necessitating constitutional controls upon it can be seen 
in other constitutional contexts too.  Scrutiny of government action 
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 138 Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1767, 1790 (2010). 
 139 The notion of the state’s monopoly on the use of coercive force includes not only acts of 
physical violence but also physical detention and interference with property, as with imprison-
ment, fines, and forfeitures.  See KRADER, supra note 137, at 21; see also Issachar Rosen-Zvi & 
Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 92 (2008) (discussing coercive 
powers associated with the state’s ability to search private property). 
 140 The Fourth Amendment’s “origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a re-
straint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon 
other than governmental agencies.”  Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
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diminishes when the government does not directly rely upon its special 
powers.141  Thus dormant commerce clause rules restricting protec-
tionist policies by states are relaxed when a state acts as a “market 
participant,” rather than as a regulator.142  Restrictions on speech that 
would be obviously unconstitutional if they were general prohibitions 
may be upheld when the government is acting in its capacity as a 
property owner or an employer.143  In those roles, the government does 
not act as a monopolist and does not interfere with a private citizen’s 
physical person or property.  The more analogous the government’s 
position is to that of an ordinary private actor, the less its behavior 
generates constitutional concern. 
These principles are implicit in the basic structure of the Fourth 
Amendment, which does not categorically proscribe such exemptions, 
instead only forbidding their “unreasonable” exercise.  More precisely, 
it requires that the government demonstrate that its actions are justi-
fied in the individual case when it seeks to avoid the general con-
straints of positive law.  Whatever else may be said about the meaning 
of reasonableness, it seems to require the existence of reasons.  A 
search is unreasonable if there is not the right kind of reason for it.144  
Similarly, the Warrant Clause is about warrants; a warrant is a kind of 
justification.145  Thus the historic writ of quo warranto was one by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 141 As Professor Edward Rubin puts it, “when the government is subject to the same rules as it 
imposes on its citizens, it is acting as a property owner; when it uses its monopoly of legitimate 
force, it is acting in its public capacity.”  Edward L. Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right 
and Its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 573, 577 n.13 (citation omitted). 
 142 See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980) (“Evenhandedness suggests that, 
when acting as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal con-
straints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 143 See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129–30 
(1981) (“[T]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property 
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828, 836 (1976))); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“[T]he government as em-
ployer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion))). 
 144 See NOAH WEBSTER, 2 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 824 
(1828) (defining “unreasonable” to mean “1. Not agreeable to reason.  2. Exceeding the bounds of 
reason; claiming or insisting on more than is fit; as an unreasonable demand.  3. Immoderate; ex-
orbitant; as an unreasonable love of life or of money.  4. Irrational.”); cf. Eric F. Citron, Note, 
Right and Responsibility in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Problem with Pretext, 116 
YALE L.J. 1072, 1101 (2007) (“To call an action such as a search or seizure ‘unreasonable’ seems 
to contemplate that the action was inappropriate in light of the officer’s reasons for taking it.”).  
This is so even if, as Professor Thomas Davies argues, the use of “unreasonable” in the Fourth 
Amendment had a narrower and more specialized meaning, reflecting opposition only to searches 
and seizures conducted on the basis of unfounded warrants and general warrants.  See Davies, 
supra note 48, at 686–93. 
 145 See WEBSTER, supra note 144, at 876–77 (defining warrant in verb form as, inter alia, “[t]o 
authorize” and “[t]o justify,” and in noun form as “[a]uthority; power that authorizes or justifies 
any act” and “[r]ight; legality”); see also WILLIAM BURKITT, EXPOSITORY NOTES WITH 
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which a person could demand that a particular person demonstrate the 
authority by which they purported to act.  It offered a way of testing 
the agency law basis for a person’s action.146  In demanding a justifi-
cation for official action, quo warranto bears a certain resemblance to 
another of the prerogative writs, habeas corpus, which requires the 
person to whom it is issued to provide a justification for detaining 
someone in his custody.  In his seminal work on the British constitu-
tion, Dicey celebrated habeas corpus precisely because it placed gov-
ernment under law.147  The Fourth Amendment is of a piece, also ad-
dressing problems of legality and abuse of power, and demanding the 
right kind of legal justification.  Requiring an adequate justification 
serves to prevent abuse of power both directly, by ensuring the propri-
ety of any particular exercise of government’s special authority, as well 
as indirectly, by reinforcing the idea that the government’s coercive 
powers are exceptional, constrained by law, and justified only in refer-
ence to the public good. 
D.  Practical Advantages 
In addition to the strong theoretical basis for the positive law mod-
el, the model has a number of practical advantages. 
1.  Clarity. — A signal advantage of the positive law model is that 
it is clearer, more predictable, and more determinate than the Katz 
test, or indeed than any plausible alternative we know of.  To be sure, 
it is only as predictable as the underlying positive law, but that is often 
quite predictable nonetheless.  While there are plenty of cases at the 
margins, the positive law handles problems like mail theft, garbage 
sifting, computer hacking, and surreptitious tailing relatively well.  
The clarity supplied by the positive law model places freedoms on a 
surer footing, gives better guidance to government officials, and makes 
it much easier to evaluate the correctness of a given Fourth Amend-
ment ruling. 
The doctrine of qualified immunity vividly illustrates the need for 
such clarity.  Qualified immunity means that a government officer 
cannot be held personally liable for violating someone’s constitutional 
right unless the right was “clearly established.”148  Given the endemic 
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PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW TESTAMENT OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS 
CHRIST 279 (17th ed. 1772) (“[G]ood intentions are no warrant for irregular actions.”). 
 146 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262 (“A writ of quo warranto is in the 
nature of a writ of right for the king, against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or 
liberty, to inquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right.”). 
 147 See DICEY, supra note 133, at 206–09; cf. WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: 
LEGEND AND LEGACY 172 (1965) (giving account of Coke’s declaration to James I that “[t]he 
King ought to be under no man, but under God and the law”). 
 148 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982)). 
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unpredictability of Katz, that condition is often unmet.  Fourth 
Amendment cases account for a large portion of qualified immunity 
decisions, and it is worth asking whether the doctrine would exist in 
anything like its current form were it not for the sense that personal 
liability for police officers cannot be combined with the muddle of 
Katz.  At any rate, we count at least three times in the past twenty 
years that the Supreme Court has awarded qualified immunity be-
cause of unclear expectations of privacy that the positive law model 
could have clarified,149 and we are sure we could find more such cases 
in the courts of appeals.150  The “good faith” doctrine operates to simi-
larly eliminate the other principal remedy for Fourth Amendment vio-
lations — the exclusionary rule.151  Federal appeals courts split over 
Fourth Amendment protection for cell-site data, for instance, but even 
in those circuits that found Fourth Amendment protection, the good 
faith doctrine meant that the exclusionary rule was unavailable.152  In 
general, we expect positive law to be less uncertain than the Katz 
standard, and also to supply many more cases for the articulation of 
the law. 
2.  Adaptability. — But perhaps more important than providing 
well-settled answers is that the positive law model provides a well-
settled method for resolving the many new Fourth Amendment scenar-
ios that arise every decade.  While past applications of the reasonable 
expectations of privacy test may sometimes be well settled, simply as a 
matter of judicial fiat,153 it is tougher to figure out how to apply it to 
new situations.  A normative test based on reasonable expectations of 
privacy poses serious challenges for judges or lawyers trying to find 
common ground.  And while there is no shortage of proposals to re-
solve the uncertainty, that overabundance of proposals is precisely the 
problem. 
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 149 They are Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999), 
and Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 
 150 See, e.g., Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1017 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (granting qualified 
immunity when deputy sheriffs unconstitutionally entered garage while the owner tried to close 
the door on them); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 847 (11th Cir. 2010) (granting qualified im-
munity because privacy rights in email were not clearly established), aff’d on unrelated issue, 132 
S. Ct. 1497 (2012); see also Moore v. Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036, 1048–49 (11th Cir. 2015); Fortson v. 
City of Elberton, 592 F. App’x 819, 823 (11th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 515–16 (7th 
Cir. 2003); Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 777–78 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 151 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 
(2009). 
 152 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 361 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 
No. 12-4659, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015).  For other cases applying the good faith 
exception because of unclear expectations of privacy, see United States v. Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 
412 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Flores, 640 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2011); and United States v. 
Taylor, 119 F.3d 625, 630 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 153 See Kerr, supra note 22, at 94–97. 
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An empirical test based on surveying actual members of the public 
is a possible solution.154  But even if one puts aside the standard objec-
tions based on the circularity of the enterprise, it is hard to scale.  To 
run the surveys well is nontrivially expensive,155 and to match the 
pace of the courts would require a whole lot of surveys.  Moreover, 
even seemingly minor changes in factual contexts could require new 
surveys if it turns out that judges are bad at predicting which factual 
changes are in fact dispositive to the public.  Indeed, one of the first 
such Fourth Amendment surveys has shown that most people do not 
care about the duration of warrantless GPS surveillance, even though 
four Supreme Court Justices thought the duration a crucial factor to 
“reasonable expectations of privacy.”156  Perhaps criminal prosecutions 
could be remade to turn on expert evidence about the habits and tastes 
of the general public, like trademark or antitrust suits, but the courts 
have shown no desire to move in such a direction. 
By contrast, the positive law model has the capacity to resolve 
Fourth Amendment cases in practice because of its reliance on the tra-
ditional tools of legal reasoning and the existing materials of positive 
law.  Rather than divining social understandings or fashioning wise 
policies of investigative procedure, the positive law model calls for the 
bread and butter of the legal profession — doctrinal analysis.  It is a 
task that is both more appropriate to judges’ roles and more suited to 
their capabilities. 
3.  Institutions. — Finally, the positive law model harnesses the 
capabilities of government institutions to engage in principled legal 
change.  The positive law model carves out significant room for legis-
lative participation in the Fourth Amendment context.  While positive 
law isn’t limited to statutory enactments, it certainly includes them.  
From the standpoint of constitutional theory, a strong argument can be 
made that legislatures are better positioned to make up rules than 
courts, while courts are better at providing procedural constraints on 
the legislative process than they are at devising and updating rules 
themselves.  That view, at any rate, is consistent with the general in-
sight of John Hart Ely, who argued that “judicial review under the 
Constitution’s open-ended provisions . . . can appropriately concern 
itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive 
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 154 See Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 46; see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 23, at 108–14 (de-
scribing a study on attitudes toward closed-camera surveillance).  
 155 Kugler and Strahilevitz report that, not including their own time, their survey on the mosaic 
theory cost $4550, which they call “cheap.”  Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 46, at 25–26 & 26 
n.124. 
 156 Id. at 34; see also Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy 26–32 
(Dec. 30, 2015) (unpublished draft) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (suggesting 
that judicial intuitions about popular knowledge of surveillance are not very accurate). 
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merits of the political choice under attack.”157  This “representation-
reinforcing”158 theory, though by no means uncontroversial, has proven 
remarkably influential and is in many ways the starting point of nor-
mative constitutional thinking today.  In the realm of privacy, it sug-
gests that courts shouldn’t construct a freestanding law of privacy — 
rather, they should leave contested choices of substance to legislatures 
while ensuring that the processes protect political equality.159  The pos-
itive law model of the Fourth Amendment conforms to that insight by 
harnessing the adaptive lawmaking power of legislatures, while tether-
ing their police power to popular rights.160 
Prominent judges have called for legislative definition of privacy 
rights in the use of new technology.  Judge Sutton argues that because 
courts will be “unable to take the lead” in responding to “the challeng-
es posed by new technology,” that job “will necessarily fall in part to 
the legislative branch.”161  Justice Alito has repeatedly called for legis-
lative guidance, saying: “In circumstances involving dramatic techno-
logical change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.  
A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, 
to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a 
comprehensive way.”162  Similar statements from other judges are  
legion.163 
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 157 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181 (1980). 
 158 Id. at 87. 
 159 For similar insights, see John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 
103 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 232–36, 267–68 (2015). 
 160 This isn’t to say that Ely would necessarily share our substantive prescriptions.  See ELY, 
supra note 157, at 172–73 (discussing only second step);  see also Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra 
note 7, at 92–103 (explaining Ely’s representative reinforcement theory, id. at 92–93, and applying 
it to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis, id. at 97).  But we don’t think it was a coin-
cidence that Ely grasped that “the notion of ‘privacy’ proves inadequate as an explanation” for 
the Fourth Amendment and that it was heavily concerned with “a fear of official discretion” and 
“avoiding indefensible inequities in treatment.”  ELY, supra note 157, at 96–97. 
 161 Jeffrey S. Sutton, Courts, Rights, and New Technology: Judging in an Ever-Changing World, 
8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 261, 278–79 (2014). 
 162 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (ci-
tation omitted); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better posi-
tion than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that 
almost certainly will take place in the future.”). 
 163 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 520 (11th Cir. 2015) (Pryor, J., concurring) (“If 
the rapid development of technology has any implications for our interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, it militates in favor of judicial caution, because Congress, not the judiciary, has the 
institutional competence to evaluate complex and evolving technologies.”); In re Askin, 47 F.3d 
100, 105–06 (4th Cir. 1995) (Wilkinson, J., for the court) (“In the fast-developing area of communi-
cations technology, courts should be cautious not to wield the amorphous ‘reasonable expectation 
of privacy’ standard in a manner that nullifies the balance between privacy rights and law en-
forcement needs struck by Congress in Title III.” (citation omitted)). 
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This legislative approach has obvious benefits.  Where judicial de-
cisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment create precedents that can 
be altered only in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis, the 
positive law model enables change to occur as quickly as a legislature 
is willing to make it.  By including legislative bodies, the positive law 
model draws upon their institutional advantages when it comes to 
factfinding, awareness of popular sentiment, and the ability to strike 
compromises by drawing arbitrary lines, rather than arguing from 
principle. 
The positive law model can also draw on the advantages of decen-
tralization within a federal system.  Different jurisdictions can experi-
ment with different approaches to individual issues, learning from one 
another or fashioning the legal practices best suited for their particular 
conditions. 
But without the Ely-like assistance that the positive law model of-
fers, a legislative approach has problems of self-dealing and under-
protection.164  Law enforcement authorities are part of the government 
and apt to receive special treatment when the government writes the 
rules.  One might hope that democratic processes will check such spe-
cial treatment, but criminal defendants are famously unpopular in the 
legislative process.165  As Professor Erin Murphy reports, “law en-
forcement is the sole interest consistently exempted from general [pri-
vacy] provisions,” and “law enforcement regularly offers its perspective 
on, and plays a critical role in shaping, not just those exemptions but 
the terms of the statutes themselves.”166  That is what rings hollow 
about the Fifth Circuit’s suggestion that those who want greater pri-
vacy protection for cell phone records should be “lobbying elected rep-
resentatives to enact statutory protections.”167  And of course the very 
point of constitutionally guaranteeing rights is to give them special 
protection from the ordinary legislative process. 
The positive law model accomplishes this by subjecting legislative 
solutions to the constraint of nonexceptionalism.168  The government 
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 164 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal 
Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1125–26 (2012).  
 165 See Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Dis-
closure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
485, 503–07 (2013); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 780, 783–84 (2006).  See generally Donald A. Dripps, Essay, Criminal Procedure, Foot-
note Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the 
Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993). 
 166 Murphy, supra note 165, at 503; see also David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think 
About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 227 (2015). 
 167 In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013), 
discussed infra note 258.  The court did also mention market solutions, id., though those are not 
facilitated by the current legal regime. 
 168 See Note, supra note 28, at 1647–48. 
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generally has a free hand to decide what interests will or won’t be pro-
tected by law in the first instance.  Maybe we want a world where 
each of us can freely traipse through one another’s backyards or freely 
soar above them; maybe we don’t.  Maybe we want a world that al-
lows promiscuous sharing of electronic messages and information; 
maybe we don’t.  The positive law model frees us to make any of 
those choices, so long as we make them generally.169  Special exemp-
tions for the government, by contrast, have to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.170 
The positive law model thus ties the neglected interests of those 
who face government investigation to the much broader interests of 
society at large.  By ensuring judicial scrutiny whenever government 
invades general positive law rights, it can be said to give potential 
criminal defendants a form of virtual representation in the legislative 
process.  It thus allows judges to get assistance in adapting the law 
without abdicating their constitutional role in maintaining an equilib-
rium between law enforcement needs and privacy concerns. 
E.  Privacy and Beyond 
Some Fourth Amendment scholars criticize the reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy construct by asking us to imagine a world without so-
cial or legal privacy.  Professor Paul Ohm paints “a nation without 
privacy, one in which powerful companies watched the moves of every 
citizen, with the full awareness and consent of the watched,” and then 
handed this information to the police upon request.171  Similarly, Pro-
fessor Jed Rubenfeld asks us to: 
  Imagine a society in which undercover police officers are ubiquitous.  
Nearly every workplace has at least one, as does nearly every public park, 
every store and restaurant, every train and plane, every university class-
room, and so on.  These undercover agents wear hidden microphones and 
video cameras, recording and transmitting everything they hear or see.  
Your colleagues, coworkers, or closest friends may be spies.  Perhaps there 
is one in your own family. 
  Existing Fourth Amendment law would find nothing wrong with this 
picture.172 
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 169 The positive law also fills in the gaps in legislation with the common law, so that there are 
still legal rules when legislatures have not acted, which Sklansky reminds us is common.  See 
Sklansky, supra note 166, at 229–30. 
 170 Some have argued that Americans in fact favor restricting government invasions of privacy 
more than private invasions.  See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: 
Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161–62, 1219 (2004).  If true, nothing in the positive 
law model stops, or even discourages, them from doing so.  For more on the differences between 
government and private actors, see infra section II.F.3, pp. 1864–66. 
 171 Ohm, supra note 24, at 1310. 
 172 Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 104. 
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It seems unthinkable that such a society would be constitutionally 
permitted, these scholars say, and hence there must be something 
wrong with the reasonable expectations of privacy construct.  We 
agree, of course, that there is something wrong with the reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy construct; but we think that these scholars take 
the wrong lesson from the imagined future scenarios.  In a sense they 
are still too fixated on privacy. 
We do think that the positive law model makes such scenarios 
much less likely to arise.  For instance, under the positive law model 
there are substantial constraints on the ability of police to obtain in-
formation from private parties — in contrast to the situation under the 
Katz-derived “third-party doctrine” that currently governs such ques-
tions.173  And more generally, it would be categorically lawful to have 
such an undercover officer in every workplace, classroom, and busi-
ness only if surreptitious video and voice recording were made categor-
ically legal for everyone.174 
But at the same time, we think these hypotheticals also miss the 
point.  If some kind of public panopticon arises in a lawful and general 
way — one in which jilted lovers, muckraking bloggers, and police of-
ficers are all free to traffic in our online data or surreptitiously record 
everything they see — the positive law model suggests that the Fourth 
Amendment has nothing bad to say about those choices.  If we are 
right that the Fourth Amendment is about uniquely governmental 
power, this makes perfect sense.  What might trouble contemporary 
readers about those regimes is just that they have different norms of 
property or privacy than we might prefer, not that the government has 
any special privilege vis-à-vis the security of the people. 
What is the point of such positivism?  For one thing, this model al-
lows privacy to float.  Any given generation might well have a coher-
ent theory — or at least a general attitude — of the proper sphere of 
privacy.175  But that sphere can change over time, and in ways any 
given generation may find hard to anticipate or even to understand.176  
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 173 See infra section III.B, pp. 1871–81, for citations and discussion. 
 174 See 2 JAMES G. CARR, PATRICIA L. BELLIA & EVAN A. CREUTZ, LAW OF ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE § 8:43, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2016) (cataloging possible legal bars). 
 175 See Matthew B. Kugler, Affinities in Privacy Attitudes: A Psychological Approach to Unify-
ing Informational and Decisional Privacy 3 (July 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2469562 [http://perma.cc/YL4N-G78N] (pre-
senting data suggesting an “internal coherence to privacy attitudes” across different dimensions). 
 176 Compare Whitman, supra note 170, at 1154 (“Anyone who wants a vivid example can visit 
the ruins of Ephesus, where the modern tourist can set himself down on one of numerous ancient 
toilet seats in a public hall where well-to-do Ephesians gathered to commune, two thousand years 
ago, as they collectively emptied their bowels.”), with Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 
1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) (“Although it is well known that every human being defe-
cates, no adult human being in our society wants a newspaper to show a picture of him  
defecating.”). 
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For instance, almost a century ago a law review published the skepti-
cal comment that “[s]ome social writers claim that the home means far 
less than in the past,” and if true, “we ought to give less importance to 
the privacy of the home, and more to the safety deposit vault or the 
other places to which the instincts of privacy have been attached in 
this modern age.”177 
Indeed, what is notable about privacy is that it is also not obvious 
that it is an unalloyed good.  And indeed sometimes it is affirmatively 
bad.  One person’s right to be let alone frequently runs into another’s 
right to know or right to speak — demonstrated dramatically by re-
cent disputes about the right to be “forgotten” by Google’s search en-
gine178 or the right to record the activities of the police.179  Indeed, the 
concept of “privacy” is used to cover a disparate set of ideas ranging 
from seclusion to informational secrecy to autonomy.180  Privacy has 
been defined so pluralistically that in many circumstances “privacy al-
so clashes with itself.”181  The positive law model abjures the ultimate 
answers to these questions by saying instead that whatever privacy is 
in a given legal regime is what must be respected.182 
This brings us to an additional advantage of the positive law mod-
el, which is that it is able to respond to the full range of interests that 
positive law itself protects.  As we’ve discussed, that surely includes 
privacy.  But it does not stop there.  Rather, the positive law model 
protects the wider set of values and aims that positive law seeks to ad-
vance.  These include personal security and autonomy;183 freedom 
from harassment;184 dignity, as in the case of a strip search;185 protec-
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 177 Thomas E. Atkinson, Note and Comment, What Is an Unreasonable Search?, 24 MICH. L. 
REV. 277, 281 (1926). 
 178 Andrew Tutt, The Revisability Principle, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1113, 1117–19 (2015). 
 179 Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (2016). 
 180 Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex Equality, Liberty, and Privacy: A Comparative Approach to the 
Feminist Critique, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION 242, 247–53 (Zoya Hasan, E. Sridharan 
& R. Sudarshan eds., 2002); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
295 (1975). 
 181 David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manu-
script at 2), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624281 [http://perma.cc/6VXR-RB6N]. 
 182 Thomson, supra note 180, at 313. 
 183 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (3d ed. 2008).  Compare Rubenfeld, 
supra note 7, at 119–22 (discussing importance of “security” in the Fourth Amendment), with 
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739 (1964) (discussing function of proper-
ty law in providing security).  
 184 Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529–30 (1984) (noting prisoner’s argument that “he is 
constitutionally entitled not to be subjected to searches conducted only to harass,” id. at 529). 
 185 Sklansky, supra note 23, at 1102–06.  Sklansky would label this dignity a kind of privacy, a 
semantic point to which we have no objection. 
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tion of economic investments186 and of incentives to cultivate re-
sources; political freedom; and emotional attachment to the things that 
one owns.187  Moreover, the positive law delineates the extent of this 
protection in ways that may also embed compromises not susceptible 
to the often-reductive terminology of legislative interests. 
The Supreme Court once remarked that property law “furthers a 
range of interests that have nothing to do with privacy,” and concluded 
that property should not therefore automatically trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection.188  The Court was correct about the open-
endedness of property and, we would add, of positive law more gener-
ally, but it drew the wrong conclusion from its observation.  That the 
law advances other interests besides privacy is just the point: to re-
strict Fourth Amendment protection to privacy is to leave other im-
portant interests unprotected from government abuse. 
F.  Objections 
In the course of laying out the affirmative case for the positive law 
model, we have implicitly responded to what we take to be the most 
sweeping argument against it — that the positive law model ignores 
the purpose of Fourth Amendment law by directing attention away 
from ideas about privacy.  We can imagine several other objections to 
what we have proposed, however, and offer a few words by way of re-
sponse under three general categories — objections based on mutabil-
ity, on administrability, and on an argument that we have the wrong 
baseline. 
1.  Mutability. — One form of objection to the positive law model 
is that constitutional meaning cannot or should not change over time 
or from place to place.  The Supreme Court, for instance, has at times 
scoffed at the idea that Fourth Amendment protections would “vary 
from place to place and from time to time.”189  We do understand the 
impulse.  Sustaining important civil liberties against strong counter-
vailing pressures seems more plausible with a relatively fixed sense of 
what those liberties entail. 
First consider time.  We generally think the purpose of a constitu-
tional principle is to freeze something in time.190  The use of positive 
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 186 See William Alden, F.B.I. Raid Was Blamed for the Demise of Two Hedge Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at B2. 
 187 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960 (1982). 
 188 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984). 
 189 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
815 (1996)). 
 190 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Orig-
inal Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015).  To be sure, the “something” could well be at a 
high level of abstraction.  See generally David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common 
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000). 
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law, however, is itself a firm principle, as is the principle of govern-
mental exceptionalism.  In other words, the Fourth Amendment’s 
meaning is indeed fixed, but what is fixed is precisely a principle of 
government nondiscrimination where personal security is concerned.  
In that way it operates like countless other constitutional principles 
whose application may change even as the core principle remains con-
stant.191  Indeed, the Court has recognized this distinction in the 
Fourth Amendment context specifically.  In Kyllo, the Court held that 
the use of a thermal imager was a search because the technology was 
not “in general public use.”192  That fact, of course, could change and 
arguably has changed in the past decade.193  Hence the application of 
the Fourth Amendment to thermal imagers might well vary “from time 
to time.”194  Yet the Court quite correctly did not think such variance 
undermined the fixity of the constitutional text or the “preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.”195 
Now for place.  Even conceding that constitutional applications 
vary over time, one might have a specific suspicion of letting constitu-
tional protections depend on state law and hence vary “from place to 
place.”196  But once again, we think such variance is in fact constitu-
tionally unexceptional.  We have already stressed the advantages of a 
constitutional model that can capitalize on the institutional strengths 
of legislatures and on the benefits of federalist constitutional structure.  
And the premise that constitutional rights must operate without refer-
ence to background positive law to be effective simply is not right, as 
we have shown by pointing to constitutional property doctrines. 
But in fact, at a deeper level, many constitutional entitlements de-
pend in part on background positive law.197  Consider antidiscrimina-
tion rules.  Suppose the State of Oklahoma makes a particular tax 
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 191 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) for examples of the ubiquity of such 
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constitutional history). 
 196 Moore, 553 U.S. at 176 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 815); see also Sacharoff, supra note 22, 
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 197 For examples of this point specifically in criminal procedure, see Wayne A. Logan, Contin-
gent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitu-
tional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143 (2009). 
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credit available to male taxpayers, while the State of Nebraska does 
not.  The Equal Protection Clause will require that the tax credit be 
given to women in Oklahoma, but it will not in Nebraska.198  Similar-
ly, if one state has all-white public schools, and another state has no 
public schools, the Equal Protection Clause gives nonwhite children a 
right to public school in one state but not the other.  These results are 
unremarkable; no one would object that the Equal Protection Clause 
means different things in one state than in another. 
A skeptic might respond that our analogy misses the point, because 
the Equal Protection Clause is an antidiscrimination provision.  But 
under the positive law model, the Fourth Amendment is also a kind of 
antidiscrimination provision: it calls for heightened scrutiny of legal 
rules that discriminate in favor of government officials.199  And it 
would not be the only part of the Bill of Rights to have an antidiscrim-
ination component.  Think of the First Amendment, which has at its 
core a requirement of content neutrality,200 and therefore can have dif-
ferent consequences depending on the generally applicable law.  Levy-
ing a four percent tax on printing presses would be unremarkable in a 
state that imposed such a tax on all industrial or commercial equip-
ment, but it would run into constitutional trouble in a state where it 
was imposed on printing equipment alone.201 
2.  Administrability. — Another argument that might be made is 
that positive law itself is not terribly clear in many instances, and, 
moreover, often calls for the same kind of analysis that Katz requires.  
Consequently, this argument goes, the positive law model merely shifts 
the drama offstage, adding complexity without lessening confusion in 
Fourth Amendment cases.  We certainly would not dispute that posi-
tive law may be unclear or unsettled on some questions, but we are 
confident the positive law model would still clarify matters substan-
tially.  Positive law can hardly do worse than Katz, and it often does 
better.  One reason is that positive law includes statutes, and while 
statutes can be and sometimes are vague or indeterminate on particu-
lar questions, they can also speak with a precision that is harder for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 198 See Evan H. Caminker, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 
YALE L.J. 1185, 1186–87 (1986). 
 199 One might object that antidiscrimination concepts don’t apply to unequal laws that privi-
lege a select group, but that’s not true of laws that privilege one kind of speech, Reed v. Town of 
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that privilege a particular religion, Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252–54 (1982); Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968). 
 200 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.  See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Re-
strictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987). 
 201 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
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common law decisions to achieve.202  We also suspect the positive law 
model itself will contribute to greater definition of positive law in a 
way that is more likely to have sticking power across time.  A decision 
that, say, using a thermal-imaging camera is or is not proscribed by a 
state’s privacy statute is likely to elicit some response from the state if 
it is off-base because that misreading may have wider implications. 
One might instead run this argument from the point of view of the 
police officer.  Should we really expect police officers to familiarize 
themselves with the technicalities of trespass law, with FAA regula-
tions and municipal garbage ordinances — indeed, with virtually all of 
the law in their jurisdiction?203  We find something ironic about this 
objection.  After all, the private people whose conduct police officers 
investigate are all held accountable for knowing the law, subject to the 
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse.204  It does not strike us 
as too much to ask officials to know the content of the law that they 
are subject to in their days off. 
One might say that our response is unfair to the police.  After all, 
unlike most ordinary citizens, a police officer’s job is to interact with 
unusual legal situations on a day-to-day basis.  Most of us don’t have 
to worry about the technicalities of trespass law because we have little 
reason to go snooping up to the limit of our neighbor’s rights.  But we 
think this objection also fades when one thinks about how the positive 
law model would likely work for police in practice. 
Most of the activities of ordinary police work — dealing with peo-
ple on the beat, ordinary questioning, and searches of homes and cars 
and businesses — will be handled in a pretty obvious and straightfor-
ward way.  Arresting people or coming into their house will remain a 
seizure and a search much like it is now.  The big changes worked by 
the positive law model are most likely to happen precisely when the 
police are knowingly doing something innovative or unusual — using 
drones or GPS devices or clever tricks to get around the traditional 
limits of their investigative powers.  These kinds of innovative investi-
gative practices are ones where police departments might have to do a 
little legal research, and that strikes us as exactly right.  When police 
are intentionally pushing the limits of their power is precisely when we 
can ask them to check whether they are pushing too far. 
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 202 See Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 62–65 (1990). 
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A different version of the administrability argument would key off 
of the practical difficulty of nonuniformity.  Even if it is theoretically 
acceptable to have a Fourth Amendment whose content varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it will simply be practically cumbersome, 
particularly for federal officials whose operations span multiple states. 
The force of this argument is likewise doubtful.  For starters, we 
think the degree of nonuniformity that would result under the positive 
law model is easy to overstate.  Although it might theoretically be pos-
sible for every state to have its own entirely distinctive rules of proper-
ty law, for instance, there is considerable consistency across all of the 
states, and it must be remembered that the point of comparison is 
Katz’s highly uncertain reasonable expectation of privacy standard.  
States can also take steps to bring about greater uniformity by coordi-
nating with one another through devices like model and uniform laws, 
and, moreover, the federal government can encourage states to under-
take such steps through a variety of means including lobbying, condi-
tional spending, and threatened preemption.  But in the final analysis, 
it is true that diversity of laws is a possibility.  That is the price, but 
also the benefit, of federalism. 
But this objection does point to a deeper consequence of the posi-
tive law model, though we are not sure it can be classified as an objec-
tion.  It is possible that the positive law model would result in some 
institutional changes to the litigation of Fourth Amendment questions.  
Federal courts already resolve state law questions in criminal cases — 
as illustrated by the many cases in which federal courts parse state 
traffic law to decide the legality of a traffic stop.205  But the positive 
law model would no doubt increase the number of cases where state 
law issues are relevant, and in many cases, the state courts would gen-
erate precedent that the federal courts would simply follow under 
Erie.206  Still, in other cases, the state law question might be unsettled, 
which would heighten the relevance of the technical machinery of fed-
eral procedure like the “Erie guess” — “predicting how the relevant 
state’s highest court would [rule] if it were given the opportunity”207 — 
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 205 See, e.g., United States v. (Henry) Martinez, 518 F.3d 763, 767 (10th Cir. 2008) (interpreting 
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or certification to state courts.208  At first the use of these tools in crim-
inal cases might seem unfamiliar,209 but we suspect that they would 
not be hard to master, especially since most federal judges are general-
ists with both civil and criminal dockets.  If for some reason the exist-
ing tools were inadequate, a new federal rule of criminal procedure 
could be considered too.  State courts, on the other hand, would likely 
find it relatively easy to handle any state law materials relevant to the 
positive law model.  Indeed, the positive law model might furnish a 
useful occasion for remembering that the vast majority of criminal 
cases, and hence the vast majority of Fourth Amendment questions, 
are litigated in state rather than federal court.210 
Similarly, the positive law model may raise the salience of choice of 
law problems in federal law.  What law (besides federal positive law) 
applies if a government agency in Washington accesses a server in Cal-
ifornia to view the data of an individual in Massachusetts?  But while 
the question may seem hard, the doctrinal resources for answering 
it — the field of conflict of laws — are rich. 
For instance, one of us has already argued that federal rules that 
depend on state law raise special choice of law problems, but they are 
problems that can be resolved through careful analysis.211  The other 
of us has pointed to the importance of uniformity in choice of law 
rules, especially when dealing with property.212  We hesitate to offer 
premature guesses to the choice of law problems here, precisely be-
cause we think they merit more extended treatment, but we are confi-
dent that conflict of laws scholars have the resources to resolve them. 
Our larger observation here is simply this: It is indeed possible, 
even likely, that the positive law model would lead to some changes in 
the structure of litigation of Fourth Amendment questions.  Some of 
those changes might be quite modest, and some might turn out to be 
more profound.  But those changes also help us to see that objections 
on the basis of unworkability should be looked at in a broader per-
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spective.  The important role played by nonconstitutional law is one of 
the promises of the positive law model, not one of its perils. 
3.  Baselines. — Some may instead argue that background positive 
“law” is the wrong baseline against which to compare government ac-
tion because the government has unique power that “law” doesn’t cap-
ture.  One form of this argument might be to assert that the positive 
law background has artificial holes in its coverage to the extent there 
are certain acts that only the government is likely to wish to perform.  
What seems like neutral treatment of government officials in fact priv-
ileges them, but the privilege is effectively invisible to formal law.  
Suppose, for instance, that the only people interested in using thermal-
imaging devices or drug-sniffing dogs are police departments.  Maybe 
these investigative tools would be regulated if they were in widespread 
use, but because they are not widely used, they are not widely  
regulated. 
There is force to this objection, but we suspect that the scenarios 
are exaggerated.  For one thing, governmental investigatory tools are 
not as unique as one might think.  You can buy a thermal-imaging de-
vice on Amazon that plugs into your phone for less than $300,213 and 
you can get the same data without the image for less than one-eighth 
the price by ordering a Black & Decker thermal leak detector, a “#1 
Best Seller.”214  You can hire private drug detection dogs too,215 and 
apparently people do.216  It is not as if private snooping and private 
investigation are unknown, or even rare.  And of course sometimes 
positive law will operate at a higher level of generality than a very 
specific technology or technique.  The discussion of implied licenses in 
Jardines,217 for example, probably could have been resolved by the 
positive law without finding a case specifically about dogs.  None of 
this means there will always be a legal regulation.  After all, lawmak-
ers may simply conclude they do not object to such behavior by pri-
vate parties.  But it does offer reason to be less concerned about the 
prospect of “holes” in the background canvas of positive law, if indeed 
we consider the divergence between actual law and the hypothetical 
law in some alternate state of affairs to be a hole. 
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It might also be said that it is artificial to liken the government to a 
private party on the basis of their formal similarity because the gov-
ernment can exert coercive force in ways whose uniqueness is not easi-
ly detected by the law.  For instance, anybody can pay someone else to 
waive their rights.  Yet when the government does it, the money it  
uses come from involuntary tax payments rather than market transac-
tions.  In a sense, the government forces A to pay B to waive B’s 
rights.218  The government can also obtain a waiver through implicit 
threat.  When a police officer asks if he can search your car, he doesn’t 
have to say out loud what he is threatening to do instead.  When the 
Department of Justice asks a regulated industry for their business re-
cords, they don’t have to say “antitrust scrutiny” for the company to 
get the gist. 
Ultimately we see these questions of waiver and implicit threat as 
versions of the unconstitutional conditions problem, which is in no 
way unique to the Fourth Amendment context, and to which we vol-
unteer no special solution.219  While it is true that background positive 
law often turns on issues of consent, and thus the positive law model 
makes consent important, consent doctrines are ubiquitous in Fourth 
Amendment law as it stands, and very few theories seem prepared to 
erase them.  What the positive law model does help to do, however, is 
identify the root of these unconstitutional conditions issues, which lies 
in the government’s unique sovereign powers.220  A doctrine sensitive 
to the varying dangers presented by the government’s demands for the 
waiver of rights will center on assessing how much the government’s 
ability to make such demands depends upon powers the legal system 
grants the government specially. 
Ultimately we can imagine a slightly less formalistic refinement of 
the positive law model that might respond to some of these concerns in 
a different way.  But we think it important to emphasize what such a 
refinement would and wouldn’t entail.  One might want to look espe-
cially hard to see whether laws that are formally neutral with respect 
to the government in fact smuggle in some kind of hidden legal privi-
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lege for government behavior.221  But don’t misunderstand this conces-
sion.  The point is to make sure that the doctrine in fact responds to 
the core concerns of government exceptionalism and legality.  But it 
would be a mistake, we think, to fret about whether any individual 
case reaches the “reasonable” outcome.  The force of the positive law 
model is that it abjures a per se view about what outcomes are “right,” 
which is part of what makes it positivist.  If people want to live in 
fishbowls, the Fourth Amendment should not be what stops them, so 
long as the government swims alongside them.  And, conversely, if 
people want to live in a world with robust limits on the ability to ob-
tain certain information about one another, the Fourth Amendment 
should keep pace. 
4.  Endogeneity. — Finally, we expect some may object that it is a 
mistake to write as if positive law were wholly independent and will 
always shape Fourth Amendment needs, rather than the other way 
around.  As we’ve emphasized, the positive law can and does change 
to meet the needs of society.  One can imagine that under the positive 
law model, courts or legislatures will pick private rules of conduct 
with the goal of authorizing a tactic of police investigation.  This 
might seem to rob the positive law of its constraining force, and injure 
private interests in the bargain. 
First of all, we are skeptical that this will happen regularly.  Fourth 
Amendment doctrine already allows government officials to do things 
that private parties can’t, so long as they obtain a warrant or other-
wise satisfy a judicial determination of reasonableness.  To imagine 
that lawmakers would be eager to ratchet down otherwise-desired pri-
vate protections because they want to aid the police would require us 
to imagine not just that enabling the police or other officials is an 
overwhelming priority, but also that the practices couldn’t be sus-
tained under the Fourth Amendment’s second step.  We submit that 
such circumstances will be relatively rare.  Moreover, we note that 
nothing comparable seems to have happened in the law of property.  
Even though positive law rights establish the baseline for the Fifth 
Amendment, we aren’t aware of widespread attempts by lawmakers or 
common law courts to dilute property rights in private law so as to fa-
cilitate government regulation. 
But even if we assume that the positive law will sometimes be 
shaped by looming Fourth Amendment concerns, we do not think this 
a devastating problem.  By its nature, this will be most likely to take 
place when the private concerns are unimportant relative to the gov-
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ernment program.  This suggests that any endogeneity will happen on 
the occasions when it is the most justified.  And ultimately, the possi-
bility that lawmakers might decide to “level down” instead of “leveling 
up” is an inevitable characteristic of any antidiscrimination rule, 
which, as we’ve said, the positive law model resembles.  This possibil-
ity is simply a price we pay for the model’s democratic restraints on 
abuse of government power. 
III.  THE POSITIVE LAW MODEL IN ACTION 
The positive law model undeniably transforms both the aims of 
Fourth Amendment law and the mode of analysis used to resolve 
Fourth Amendment problems.  At the same time, it responds to some 
strongly held intuitions that appear to have guided the development of 
search-and-seizure law, perhaps only unconsciously.  The result is that 
in some areas, the positive law model helps account for existing doc-
trine and places it on a strong conceptual footing.  In other areas, 
however, the model suggests different answers, or at least a clearer and 
noticeably different mode of reaching them. 
A.  Explaining Current Law 
First, let’s see how the Court sometimes ends up using the positive 
law model, explicitly or implicitly, even aside from Jones and Jardines.  
We don’t mean to overstate the extent to which current law conforms 
to the model, but we do wish to suggest that Katz’s privacy-based 
model doesn’t actually accomplish the work it purports to.  And 
meanwhile, the logic of the positive law model is such that even a 
Court that claims to reject it can’t help but rely on its logic over and 
over again. 
For example, in California v. Ciraolo, the Court concluded that po-
lice surveillance of a home was not a search when it was conducted 
from an airplane “traveling in the public airways” and limited to 
“observ[ing] what is visible to the naked eye.”222  The opinion’s refer-
ence to “an aircraft lawfully operating” seems to directly invoke the 
positive law, and it is otherwise replete with references to “public thor-
oughfares,” “a public vantage point,” “public airways,” and “navigable 
airspace,” which seem to at least hint at the positive law model by em-
phasizing places where the general public can lawfully be.223 
In Florida v. Riley, the Court doubled down on Ciraolo and a plu-
rality gave an even greater role to positive law.224  In Riley, the sur-
veillance was conducted from a helicopter operating at a mere 400 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 222 See 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
 223 See id. at 213–15. 
 224 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
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feet.225  The lower court had thought Ciraolo distinguishable on prac-
tical grounds, because the “circling and hovering helicopter” could see 
things that couldn’t be seen “by any person casually flying over the ar-
ea in a fixed-wing aircraft.”226 
But the Supreme Court disagreed in a split opinion that concluded 
there was no search.  Of “obvious importance” to the plurality was the 
fact that the helicopter had not violated FAA altitude restrictions, 
which prohibited flights at altitudes less than 500 feet by airplanes but 
not by helicopters.227  In other words, what the plane in Ciraolo and 
the helicopter in Riley had in common was not the amount of infor-
mation they could gather — the lower, slower helicopter could gather 
much more — but their compliance with positive law. 
We don’t mean to cast Riley as a full-throated endorsement of the 
positive law model.  The plurality still dutifully stipulated that it was 
not saying “that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an air-
craft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply 
because the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law.”228  
And Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment to insist that “the 
relevant inquiry after Ciraolo is not whether the helicopter was where 
it had a right to be under FAA regulations,” but rather required a 
parsing of Katz and heavy reliance on the burden of proof borne by 
the defendant.229 
But we still think the positive law, rather than privacy, best ex-
plains the intuition that the FAA regulations are relevant.  The FAA 
regulations at issue in Riley, for instance, aimed to ensure aviation 
safety, not to protect against unwanted surveillance.230  Sure, one 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 225 Id. at 448 (plurality opinion). 
 226 Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 288 (Fla. 1987) (Barkett, J.). 
 227 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 & n.3 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1988)). 
 228 Id. at 451.  But was it saying that it would not? 
 229 Id. at 454–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  Though we doubt it is what Jus-
tice O’Connor had in mind, we should mention that by our lights Riley’s positive law analysis 
was incomplete.  Establishing that the helicopter was complying with an FAA regulation for min-
imum safe altitudes does not tell us whether any positive law forbids spying on people from those 
flight altitudes.  Now maybe Florida law doesn’t forbid such spying.  But c.f. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that aerial surveillance is 
regulated by Texas trade secrets law).  Or maybe any such prohibition is in turn preempted by 
federal law.  But see Letter from Clark H. Onstad, Chief Counsel, Fed. Aviation Admin., to Rep-
resentative Clair W. Burgener (Sept. 10, 1980), 1980 WL 570352, at *1 (“If a nuisance is caused or 
damages result from aircraft overflights, the injured party may have a basis for pursuing relief in 
state court.  The remedies which may be available depend on state law . . . .”).  Either way, the 
positive law model would have prompted those questions. 
 230 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Kerr, supra 
note 8, at 533 (criticizing the Riley Court’s use of FAA regulations for this reason); Yeager, supra 
note 74, at 298–99 (same). 
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might think that positive law shapes social expectations,231 but it is 
hard to believe that “shared social expectations” really take on the kind 
of particularity that would distinguish between an airplane flight at 
500 feet and one at 400 feet.  Indeed, this view supposes that in a case 
like Riley, prevailing social sensibilities would understand a low-flying 
airplane to represent a greater invasion of privacy than an equally 
low-flying helicopter, despite the fact that a plane must keep moving 
forward at considerable speed while a helicopter can hover in place.232 
The positive law model we have outlined explains why the Court 
sometimes looks to law rather than expectations.  When the Riley plu-
rality argued that “[t]he police officer did no more” than what “[a]ny 
member of the public could legally” have done, for instance, the crucial 
consideration is that the officer was not doing anything illegal that 
would thus set him apart from a private actor, even if it was unusual, 
unexpected, and quite undesired.233  This reading is consistent with 
positions the Court has taken in other contexts.  The Court has said, 
for example, that a police officer without a warrant may approach a 
home and knock on the front door without bringing the Fourth 
Amendment into play “precisely because that is ‘no more than any 
private citizen might do.’”234  Similarly, it is no search for the police to 
note that someone is growing marijuana in his front yard, for “the po-
lice cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of 
criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the 
public.”235  These statements can be explained as reflecting the sense 
that the Fourth Amendment’s core concerns aren’t brought into play 
in situations where the police stand in a position of equality with pri-
vate citizens. 
To be sure, the reasonable expectation of privacy test can explain 
these rules too, though a bit more clumsily.236  Things get trickier, 
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 231 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (positing that 
property law “‘naturally enough influence[s]’ our ‘shared social expectations’” (alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006))). 
 232 Accord Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 288 (Fla. 1987); cf. Riley, 488 U.S. at 462 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (postulating, prophetically, “a helicopter capable of hovering just above an enclosed 
courtyard or patio without generating any noise, wind, or dust at all”). 
 233 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 (plurality opinion). 
 234 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)).  The 
plain view doctrine, discussed infra in notes 235–239 and in the accompanying text, can be seen as 
a specialized application of this principle, as can rules about containers.  See United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
 235 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). 
 236 Society does not consider an expectation of privacy to be legitimate when it implicates mat-
ters that “a person knowingly exposes to the public.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967); see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[C]onversations in the open would not be pro-
tected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be 
unreasonable.”).  This is more in the way of conclusion than explanation, however. 
  
1870 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 129:1821 
however, when information is revealed lawfully but unforeseeably.  For 
example, the police normally need individualized suspicion to open the 
trunk of an automobile, and hence drivers expect things they put in 
the trunk to be somewhat private.  Yet if the car is in an accident that 
damages the trunk, rendering its contents visible, the police may ob-
serve the contents without committing a search.237  Similarly, if a 
house catches fire and firefighters enter and observe signs of illegal 
conduct within, their additional observation does not trigger the 
Fourth Amendment.238  This is easy to explain on the positive law 
model but harder to explain in terms of reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy — the driver and the homeowner did not reasonably expect the 
accident or the fire, and hence expected privacy. 
One could gerrymander the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
to be highly contingent — one has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in one’s home . . . except for all of the unexpected things that might 
take it away.  But the twists involved render the privacy test very mal-
leable and suggest that something else is going on.  The positive law 
model avoids these contortions, offering a straightforward explanation 
grounded in the government’s special powers.  And that, we think, 
may be why the “plain view” doctrine often speaks of whether the of-
ficer is “where he has a right to be,” not just where he is expected to 
be.239 
To consider another example, it is generally not a search for the 
government to review its own records.240  The reasonable expectations 
test struggles here too.  One might well have an expectation of privacy 
in government records, when, for instance, the government develops 
new and secret databases and search capabilities.  The positive law 
model, however, supplies both an explanation and a limiting principle 
for the proposition.  The explanation is that it is no search because a 
private party may generally examine its own records as it sees fit.  The 
limiting principle is twofold.  First, to the extent the owner of records 
is limited by law in its ability to access, use, or disclose information in 
its possession, an exception from such restrictions applicable to gov-
ernment officials would indeed bring the Fourth Amendment into play.  
Second, insofar as the records are obtained by governmental coercion, 
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 237 See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 864 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the 
plain view doctrine applied and no search occurred after an accident where “the trunk lid was 
damaged so that [an officer] could look into the trunk and he flashed his light into it and saw the 
shotgun”). 
 238 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (concluding that after entering “a burning struc-
ture to put out the blaze . . . firefighters may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view”).  
 239 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (emphasis added); accord Washington v. 
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1982) (same); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (same). 
 240 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 331–32 
(2012). 
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it may be appropriate to limit the use of those records to the purposes 
justifying the coercion. 
Finally, the positive law model helps explain why the threshold 
search/seizure inquiry exists in the first place.  After all, if what mat-
tered were reasonableness, we could easily say that looking at a house 
from the outside is a search but one that isn’t unreasonable.  Why 
treat some cases as categorically exempt from Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness scrutiny?241  The structure of the doctrine is especially 
puzzling in the Katz regime, which creates a separate reasonableness 
analysis at the first step of the Fourth Amendment framework, prior to 
evaluating the reasonableness of the government’s conduct at the sec-
ond step.242  (Not surprisingly, courts sometimes elide the question of 
whether the government has acted contrary to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy with the question of whether such action is reason-
able.243)  The two-stage inquiry makes perfect sense under the positive 
law model.  The Fourth Amendment’s second step, reasonableness, is a 
special scrutiny for special government power.  Its first step, the devia-
tion from general law, determines when that scrutiny is needed.  Addi-
tional scrutiny and justification are called for only when the govern-
ment seeks to deviate from the baseline established by generally 
applicable laws and cloaks itself in the special authority of the state.244 
B.  Sorting Out Three-Body Problems 
In many other areas, however, the positive law model will change 
law more than it will explain it.  We start with one of the most im-
portant such areas — the interaction of multiple parties and the police. 
1.  Third-Party Doctrine. — It is black-letter law under Katz that 
people don’t have any Fourth Amendment protection for information 
given to a third party.  In the paradigmatic case, A gives information 
to B and the government then obtains the information from B.  The 
third-party doctrine holds that A has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in any information voluntarily provided to B, the third party, 
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 241 See Amar, supra note 47, at 769 (“These word games are unconvincing and unworthy.  A 
search is a search, whether with Raybans or x-rays.  The difference between these two searches is 
that one may be much more reasonable than another.” (citation omitted)); see also Richard A.  
Epstein, Entick v. Carrington and Boyd v. United States: Keeping the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments on Track, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 27, 48–49 (2015) (“The wrong approach to these issues is to 
deny searches when they in fact occur . . . .  [T]he proper question was whether there was reason-
able suspicion . . . .”); id. at 38. 
 242 Amar, supra note 47, at 769 (“[I]n the landmark Katz case, the Court, perhaps unconsciously, 
smuggled reasonableness into the very definition of the Amendment’s trigger . . . .”). 
 243 Compare Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (discussing whether expectation of pri-
vacy was reasonable), with Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (discussing whether 
government search was reasonable). 
 244 See Note, supra note 28, at 1632–33.  
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“even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be 
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third 
party will not be betrayed.”245 
In practice this means, for instance, that the Fourth Amendment 
does not restrict the government’s receipt of records about a person 
from their bank246 or telephone company.247  It likewise means that the 
government may obtain information from a person’s employer, spouse, 
lawyer, or neighbor without triggering the Fourth Amendment,248 
though of course other protections and privileges may apply in some of 
these situations.  The doctrine also categorically licenses the use of 
confidential informants.  Together, these cases illustrate that in no cir-
cumstances where a person has voluntarily given information to some-
one else can the government ever violate that person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights by extracting the information from the recipient.  
To be sure, the third party may have Fourth Amendment rights of 
their own to assert, but that protection is at best indirect and incom-
plete from the point of view of the first party. 
This rule has been roundly criticized by commentators.249  As an 
empirical statement about subjective expectations of privacy, it seems 
quite dubious.250  As a normative assessment of when a person ought 
to be able to expect confidentiality (never), it is antisocial at best.  Yet 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test makes it difficult to ever say 
any particular result is clearly wrong.  In some sense, A does “assume 
the risk” that B will disclose information to someone else when A vol-
untarily gives it to B — as a factual matter because B cannot disclose 
what B does not know and as a normative matter because the Court 
forces people to assume it.251  Yet it is hard to imagine abandoning the 
third-party doctrine altogether.  It would be very strange if a decision 
by someone’s co-conspirator to rat them out, unprompted by the gov-
ernment, would nevertheless subject the government to reasonableness 
scrutiny, and presumptively require it to get a warrant.252 
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 245 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 246 Id. 
 247 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 248 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
 249 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563–64 (2009) 
(“The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate. . . . The verdict 
among commentators has been frequent and apparently unanimous: The third-party doctrine is 
not only wrong, but horribly wrong.” (citations omitted)). 
 250 See Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 46 (manuscript at 6). 
 251 Kerr, supra note 249, at 564 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 744); see also Williamson v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 1026, 1029 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Obviously, 
citizens must bear only those threats to privacy which we decide to impose.”). 
 252 See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (“Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the 
view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom 
he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”). 
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The growing importance of electronic communications has put ex-
tra pressure on the third-party doctrine.  Some scholars have argued 
that the existing third-party precedents should not be extended to elec-
tronic communications.253  In a similar spirit, Justice Sotomayor has 
written that the third-party doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age, in 
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”254  The 
Court has announced that it wishes to proceed with caution in the 
whole area,255 and some have suggested that the Court has signaled to 
lower courts that prior third-party precedents are not fully applica-
ble.256  At least one federal judge has taken the bait, concluding: 
“[P]resent-day circumstances — the evolutions in the Government’s 
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship 
between the NSA and telecom companies — [are] so thoroughly unlike 
those considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that a 
precedent like Smith simply does not apply.”257 
Three courts of appeals have disagreed on whether the third-party 
doctrine precludes a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site re-
cords,258 and some version of the question is sure to be on the Supreme 
Court’s docket sooner or later.  Yet if electronic communications are 
freed from preexisting precedents under the third-party doctrine, it is 
hard to see what replaces them.  Freestanding reasonable expectations 
of privacy do not offer much in the way of clarity or predictability. 
The positive law model can help, though it would mean substantial 
revision to the third-party doctrine in its current categorical form.  
From the standpoint of positive law, the decisive question is whether 
the government has broken the law or relied on a governmental ex-
emption from the law in obtaining information.  That will frequently 
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 253 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1375, 1403–06 (2004); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Commu-
nications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1557, 1579–82 (2004). 
 254 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 255 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759–60 (2010) (“The Court must proceed with 
care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on 
electronic equipment owned by a government employer.”  Id. at 759.). 
 256 See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. (forth-
coming 2016) (manuscript at 43), h t t p : / / p a p e r s . s s r n . c o m / s o l 3 / p a p e r s . c f m ? a b s t r a c t _ i d = 2 6 9 9 6 0 7 
[http://perma.cc/ZL9K-A6DX] (discussing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)). 
 257 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 258 Compare United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy), and In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 
724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (same), with United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 
2015) (yes there is), reh’g en banc granted, No. 12-4659, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015). 
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turn on the legal relationship between A and B and the legal obliga-
tions others have to honor that relationship.259 
If, for instance, A gives information to B, and B is under no legal 
duty to maintain confidentiality, B’s voluntary disclosure to the gov-
ernment does not violate the Fourth Amendment.  If, on the other 
hand, A gives information to B, B agrees to a valid contract obligating 
him not to disclose the information to anyone else, and a government 
agent then bribes B to provide the information, the Fourth Amend-
ment may be triggered, assuming such bribery amounts to tortious in-
terference with contract.  Likewise, if A gives information to B, and 
the government compels B to disclose the information or go to jail, or 
if the government somehow obtains the information from B in circum-
stances where an ordinary person would owe a duty to A not to re-
ceive, possess, or use the information — think of trade secrets and in-
dustrial espionage — the Fourth Amendment would be triggered. 
As we’ve already indicated, application of the positive law model 
will frequently be context-specific and even jurisdiction-specific, so 
generalizations are perilous.  But to generalize nonetheless, it will often 
be helpful to divide the third-party cases into those where the govern-
ment compels the third party to reveal the information, and those 
where the government induces the third party to do so.  Compulsion is 
highly likely to trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protections, because 
there are few positive law contexts where private interlopers have the 
power to compel a third party to disclose information.260  Inducement, 
on the other hand, is something that private parties can often, but by 
no means always, legally do. 
Finally, we note that the positive law model does happen to capture 
the intuition that electronic communications merit special treatment.  
The Wiretap Act and The Stored Communications Act, amended and 
enacted as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,261 both 
provide generally applicable privacy protections for electronic commu-
nications.262  The Acts provide a special process, less than a warrant, 
for the government to demand information.263  But the positive law 
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 259 For an attempt to ground a similar analysis in the privacy framework of Katz itself, see 
Randy Barnett, Why the NSA Data Seizures Are Unconstitutional, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
3, 13 (2015) (“[B]y availing themselves of the law of property and contract, people create their own 
zones of privacy.  In short, first comes property and contract, then comes privacy.”). 
 260 Cf. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178–82 (1980) (finding that private grantees generally 
are not subject to FOIA). 
 261 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.). 
 262 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521, 2701–2711 (2012).  For much more detail, see generally Orin S. 
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004). 
 263 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
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model requires Fourth Amendment scrutiny for such government ex-
ceptions.  Such an exemption from the generally applicable positive 
law of privacy must be pursuant to a warrant or otherwise survive 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness scrutiny.264 
This provides the starting framework for answering pending ques-
tions about the reasonable expectation of privacy in various electronic 
communications.  One such controversy is over the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in historical cell-site data.265  Such data is a “record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber . . . or customer” that does 
not include “the contents of communications.”266  Service providers 
can voluntarily choose to provide this noncontent information to the 
public at large (to anybody other than a “governmental entity”).267  
This means that it is not a Fourth Amendment search or seizure for 
the government to ask for and receive this information voluntarily.268 
By contrast, private parties cannot compel this information to be 
turned over, so government compulsion of such information would 
trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  This suggests that the Fourth 
Circuit panel opinion in Graham was correct to recognize that the 
compelled disclosure of cell-site data triggers Fourth Amendment scru-
tiny.269  However the court’s statement that “the government conducts 
a search under the Fourth Amendment when it obtains and inspects a 
cell phone user’s historical [cell-site data] for an extended period of 
time”270 is a little too broad under the positive law model, because it 
does not distinguish voluntary from compelled disclosures.  And it is 
also a little too narrow, because it relies on the duration of the inspec-
tion, not the character of the disclosure. 
Electronic content information receives still more protection under 
the positive law model.  Providers cannot disclose it to the general 
public even voluntarily.271  Outside of a few narrow exceptions,272 
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 264 It’s also possible, for example, that existing Terms of Service agreements between users and 
their providers could contain provisions that satisfy the “consent” requirement of positive law.  
For discussion in the positive law context, see, for example, In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, 
No. 13-MD-02430, 2013 WL 5423918, at *12–15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013), and for discussion in 
the Fourth Amendment context, see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286–88 (6th Cir. 
2010) and Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 526–27 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 265 See cases cited supra note 258. 
 266 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c). 
 267 Id. § 2702(a)(3), (c)(6).  
 268 It is true that the Stored Communications Act requires governments, unlike anybody else, to 
go through certain procedures to access noncontent records.  But these procedures do not change 
the positive law baseline under our theory.  See supra p. 1832. 
 269 See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 
No. 12-4659, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015). 
 270 Id. 
 271 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(c), 2702(a). 
 272 E.g., id. §§ 2511(2)(a)(i), 2702(b)(5). 
  
1876 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 129:1821 
providers need the consent of one of the communicating parties to dis-
close it.273  This means that the contents of email should generally re-
tain Fourth Amendment protection under the positive law model, con-
trary to what the most exuberant applications of the third-party 
doctrine would suggest.274 
This analysis is just illustrative.  The relevant statutes are compli-
cated, and their coverage is incomplete.275  But we think it shows that 
the positive law model can and should replace the third-party doc-
trine — and gives some sense of how the model would handle the spe-
cial and urgent problem of privacy in digital information. 
2.  First- and Third-Party Consent. — The importance of induce-
ment also raises a related three-body problem, which is the scope of 
consent.  (Indeed, we note that one of the leading defenders of the 
third-party doctrine supports it on the ground that “the third-party 
doctrine is better understood as a form of consent rather than as an 
application of Katz.”276)  And consent problems frequently arise in oth-
er contexts as well. 
How does the positive law model handle such problems?  In gen-
eral, whatever waives a positive law right should also waive Fourth 
Amendment protection, since the latter is premised on the former.  
Hence the Supreme Court cases that categorically license the use of 
undercover informants are a little too, well, categorical.  On Lee v. 
United States, for instance, rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to 
the use of the defendant’s friend as a “stool pigeon . . . wired for 
sound” who entered On Lee’s business and chatted him up about crim-
inal activities.277  On Lee had let the informant in (he was a friend), 
but he nonetheless argued that this was a “trespass ab initio” under the 
common law because of the informant’s fraud and subsequent con-
duct.  The Court wasn’t willing to concede that the informant had vio-
lated the common law, but it decided that it didn’t care.  The Court 
called it “doubtful that the niceties of tort law . . . are of much aid in 
determining rights under the Fourth Amendment” and rejected “such 
fine-spun doctrines for exclusion of evidence.”278  In subsequent cases 
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 273 Id. §§ 2511(2)(c–d), (3)(b)(ii), 2702(b)(3). 
 274 For such overexuberance, see, for example, Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1281–82 (11th 
Cir. 2010), rev’d in part on reh’g, 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 275 Kerr, supra note 262, at 1214 (“The [Stored Communications Act] is not a catch-all statute 
designed to protect the privacy of stored Internet communications . . . .”). 
 276 Kerr, supra note 249, at 588. 
 277 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952). 
 278 Id. at 752.  The Court also relied upon McGuire v. United States, which made similar nois-
es but seems ultimately to have been an exclusionary rule case.  273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927) (“A crimi-
nal prosecution is more than a game in which the Government may be checkmated and the game 
lost merely because its officers have not played according to rule.  The use by prosecuting officers 
of evidence illegally acquired by others does not necessarily violate the Constitution nor affect its 
admissibility.”). 
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the Court reaffirmed the irrelevance of fraudulently obtained  
consent.279 
Under the positive law model, however, those niceties and fine-
spun doctrines are exactly what matter.  In some circumstances, con-
sent to enter private property will be valid even if somewhat fraudu-
lent.280  For example, a restaurant critic who conceals his identity, a 
shopper who feigns interest in a purchase, a bad friend who one 
oughtn’t invite to dinner, and an investigative journalist secretly vid-
eotaping a fraud have all been said not to be trespassers.281  On the 
other hand, sometimes fraud has been held relevant to a trespass or an 
invasion of privacy.282  This developed body of law handles the ques-
tion of fraudulent entries better than the Court’s categorical refusal to 
engage.283 
A slightly more complicated question arises in situations where one 
person attempts to give permission to government officials to search or 
seize items belonging, at least in part, to someone else.  Under the posi-
tive law model, a court resolves these questions by looking to underly-
ing rules of property and agency law.  Thus, whether B has the right 
to authorize a police officer to enter a house that A and B jointly own 
depends on whether B has the right to authorize others to do so, and 
on whether others violate the law by acting on B’s purported authori-
zation if that authorization is invalid.  The problem is structurally akin 
to that presented by the third-party doctrine.  After an individual has 
given control over something — a house, information — to someone 
else, does it follow that the government may obtain that thing from the 
other person, so long as the other person consents, without any Fourth 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 279 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 
293, 302–03 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210–11 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 
373 U.S. 427, 437–38 (1963).  The one exception seemingly preserved by the cases, Gouled v. Unit-
ed States, involved an agent who tricked his way into an office and then stole some documents 
when the owner wasn’t looking.  255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).  But Gouled effectively applies only to 
searches that exceed the scope of the fraudulently obtained consent, not the validity of that con-
sent in the first place.  Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 303; Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438. 
 280 See generally Laurent Sacharoff, Trespass and Deception, 2015 BYU L. REV. 359, 375–86 
(attempting to synthesize the cases). 
 281 Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (so holding as to 
the investigative journalists and suggesting the other examples); id. at 1352 (collecting many more 
examples across positive law).  
 282 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 518–19 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).  Contra Kerr, supra note 249, at 588 
(“The fact that a person turns out to be an undercover agent should be irrelevant to whether the 
consent is valid, as that representation is merely fraud in the inducement rather than fraud in the 
factum.”); Sacharoff, supra note 280, at 396–98 (critiquing Food Lion). 
 283 Sacharoff says that the “civil trespass by deception cases themselves are largely a mess,” 
supra note 280, at 363, though he then disentangles several of them with admirable clarity.  In any 
event, for informants who use electronic recording, there is also the extensive statutory law of sur-
reptitious recording.  See CARR, supra note 174, for a survey. 
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Amendment limitation?  Under the positive law model, the question is 
whether the government violates any generally applicable legal duty 
by obtaining the information from the person to whom it was entrust-
ed, which itself turns on the person’s authority to grant access under 
background law. 
Hence, the positive law model would modify some of the Court’s 
cases about who may consent to the search of a house and when.  In 
United States v. Matlock, the Court held that consent to search a piece 
of property can be given by anybody who “possessed common authori-
ty over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects.”284  In 
deciding who possessed “common authority,” the Court rejected “the 
law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements,”285 
though positive law may well come out to the same effect most of the 
time, because under positive law a lone cotenant can generally give 
visitors the right to enter.286 
However in a later case, Georgia v. Randolph, the rejection of the 
positive law model appeared to be more conclusive.287  Randolph held 
that a cotenant’s power to admit the police to search vanished when 
another cotenant was also at the door and objecting, a distinction that 
generally makes no difference to the positive law.288  Despite half-
heartedly claiming some support in “domestic property law,”289 the 
Court admitted that the reason it could distinguish Matlock was its re-
liance on “customary social understanding” rather than “the private 
law of property.”290  Meanwhile, in dissent, Justice Scalia explicitly in-
voked positive law principles, noting that historically “someone who 
had power to license the search of a house by a private party could au-
thorize a police search,” and that this power did indeed “turn[] on ‘his-
torical and legal refinements’ of property law.”291  And in a later case 
that narrowed Randolph, Justice Scalia again chimed in to assert that 
“traditional property-based understanding[s] of the Fourth Amend-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 284 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
 285 Id. at 171 n.7.   
 286 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 144 (2006); see, e.g., Dinsmore v. Renfroe, 225 P. 886, 888–
89 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Buchanan v. Jencks, 96 A. 307, 309 (R.I. 1916); Williams v. Bruton, 
113 S.E. 319, 325 (S.C. 1922); see also State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971). 
 287 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 288 Id. at 106. 
 289 Id. at 114. 
 290 Id. at 120–21.  Of course some positive property law might incorporate customs, but the 
Court did not take that tack either. 
 291 Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 
(1974)).  Justice Scalia also argued that “[t]here is nothing new or surprising in the proposition that 
our unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies of law that might themselves change,” by ref-
erence to constitutional property.  Id. at 144. 
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ment” remained a viable supplement to Katz.292  The positive law 
model would have indeed pursued a variation of Justice Scalia’s in-
quiry, asking whether a private person could, on the basis of such con-
flicting assertions of authority, lawfully enter a dwelling in Georgia 
and California respectively. 
The positive law model also might modify the rules for mistaken 
consent, where the police believe they have received consent from 
someone who it turns out has no authority to grant it.  Current doc-
trine asks whether the mistake was reasonable, as it would of a factual 
mistake about the address of a house.293  The positive law model 
would start by asking whether entry based on mistaken consent violat-
ed positive law, which generally turns on questions of “apparent au-
thority,” allowing entry in a somewhat narrower range of reasonable 
mistakes.294  This doesn’t rule out the possibility that a search without 
apparent authority could be found to be “reasonable,”295 but it would 
force us to ask the waiver question at an earlier stage, and in a differ-
ent way. 
Finally, we must note that the unconstitutional conditions problem 
we noted previously can be especially tricky in these situations, insofar 
as what is treated as consensual disclosure by third parties is really ob-
tained by virtue of subtle coercive pressures brought to bear upon 
them.  Thus, for instance, it is possible that a telephone company will 
disclose information about its subscribers to government agencies 
without being formally required to do so because it fears that the gov-
ernment will be less favorably inclined toward the company in the ex-
ercise of its other regulatory powers — an FCC licensing decision, for 
instance.296  If the government forces a telecom provider to breach a 
contractual obligation to its subscriber, a Fourth Amendment search 
plainly occurs.  But that pressure may not operate in the open and 
may be harder to trace.  We admit that finding such hidden coercion 
may be one of the hardest applications of the positive law model, 
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 292 Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Florida 
v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (Scalia, J.) (majority opinion)). 
 293 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). 
 294 See, e.g., Lugue v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1360 (S.D. Ga. 1997); Dickinson v. 
Charter Oaks Tree & Landscaping Co., No. 02AP-981, 2003 WL 1924638, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 24, 2003); Corral-Lerma v. Border Demolition & Envtl. Inc., 467 S.W.3d 109, 121–22 (Tex. 
App. 2015); Munns v. State, 412 S.W.3d 95, 100 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 295 Rodriguez can be read as focusing solely on reasonableness, assuming that there is a search.  
See 497 U.S. at 187. 
 296 See, e.g., Andrea Peterson, A CEO Who Resisted NSA Spying Is Out of Prison. And He 
Feels “Vindicated” by Snowden Leaks, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www 
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-prison-and-he-feels-vindicated-by-snowden-leaks [http://perma.cc/82V5-5QGK] (alleging retalia-
tion for failure to cooperate with surveillance program). 
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though once again,297 we are not convinced that the difficulty is a fatal 
flaw of our model. 
3.  Additional “Standing” Requirements? — Finally, we wish to 
flag, though not to fully resolve, the possibility of additional require-
ments, sometimes referred to as Fourth Amendment “standing,” that 
arise where the government has violated the Fourth Amendment rights 
of B but arguably not those of A.  We accept the proposition that one 
person generally may not invoke the constitutional rights of another,298 
but the hard question is whose rights have been violated in any given 
positive law scenario. 
It might be tempting at this point to say that the positive law mod-
el implies that A has a Fourth Amendment “right” only if A personally 
would have a remedy under positive law.299  But that approach 
doesn’t make much sense even on positive law terms, for it is altogeth-
er possible that a person holds a positive law right without being able 
to bring a lawsuit in the event the right is violated.  The right might 
be protected entirely by criminal law, for instance.300  Conversely, a 
person might hold the right to sue but only to vindicate someone else’s 
primary right.  We might think, for example, of a trustee, a receiver, an 
executor, or a guardian ad litem.301 
So one might instead be tempted to limit Fourth Amendment pro-
tection to those whose positive law primary rights have been in-
fringed — that is, to say that the violation of a positive law duty vio-
lates A’s Fourth Amendment rights only when the positive law duty is 
owed to A.  We agree with that formulation as a minimum, but as a 
complete approach to the “standing” question this approach also falters 
on positive law terms.  Positive law often concerns itself more clearly 
with legal duties than with who, if anyone, holds an individual right 
that the duty be obeyed.  Indeed, one of the great debates among legal 
theorists is over how to determine whether and upon whom a legal du-
ty confers a legal right.302  To make Fourth Amendment right-holding 
depend on positive law right-holding would essentially require taking 
a position on a debate the positive law itself has not yet resolved. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 297 See supra notes 219–221 and accompanying text. 
 298 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978). 
 299 Note, supra note 28, at 1640. 
 300 E.g., 1 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF 
TORTS 337–38 (2d ed. 1986).  Some rights may also be protected only by a suit for nominal dam-
ages.  Sacharoff, supra note 280, at 366, 392–93. 
 301 See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 287–
88 (2008). 
 302 See, for example, the disputing essays in MATTHEW H. KRAMER, N.E. SIMMONDS & 
HILLEL STEINER, A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS (1998); and Alon Harel, Theories of Rights, in 
THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 191, 194–97 
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
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This isn’t to say positive law has no effect on the question of 
Fourth Amendment “standing.”  If B, the owner of a house, consents 
to have it searched by the police, there can be no violation of A’s 
Fourth Amendment rights because B’s power to consent ensures that 
the police do not violate positive law.  Likewise, if positive law makes 
it tortious to do a particular act only if it injures B, then A suffers no 
Fourth Amendment violation when the government does that act 
without injuring B, even if A suffers harm in the process.303 
So we think it makes the most sense simply to ask whether the 
government action has violated the positive law in a way that injures 
the person invoking the Fourth Amendment.  While we can imagine 
those who would advocate for additional “standing” limits on top of 
those, we doubt there is any practical need for them in light of the pos-
itive law rules for third parties and waiver.  But to fully resolve that 
question we’d have to get into ancillary issues like the scope of par-
ticular remedies — such as the exclusionary rule or § 1983 — and 
maybe also the meaning of the word “their” in the Fourth Amend-
ment.304  What we can say is that the positive law understanding of 
searches and seizures itself does not demand additional limits. 
C.  Revising Current Law 
While we believe that these three-body problems are some of the 
most immediately useful applications of the positive law model, there 
are plenty more.  Indeed, part of the power of the model is its 
transsubstantive breadth. 
1.  Abandonment. — Police regularly find information about people 
by sifting through their trash.  This practice was given the green light 
by the Supreme Court in California v. Greenwood, which held that 
there was no expectation of privacy under Katz in trash sitting on the 
curb for collection.305  Even though the defendants had placed their 
trash “in opaque plastic bags, which the garbage collector was ex-
pected to pick up,” and expected it to remain private, the Court con-
cluded that “society [was not] prepared to accept that expectation as 
objectively reasonable” because it had been “exposed” to the public by 
being left on the street.306 
Once again, the positive law model presents a more nuanced pic-
ture.  In Greenwood the Court specifically rejected an argument based 
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 303 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 304 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92–96 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).  One might also 
add the word “secure,” which has been argued to support a “collective rights” approach to the 
Fourth Amendment.  See [Richard H. McAdams], Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Moni-
toring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 318–19 (1985). 
 305 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). 
 306 Id. at 39–40. 
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on state law — that because the California state constitution prohibit-
ed the search at issue (albeit without an exclusionary rule), it should 
also be considered a search under federal constitutional law.307  Be-
cause the state constitutional provision applied only to government ac-
tivity, it alone would not necessarily trigger the Fourth Amendment 
under the positive law model. 
But there was a second positive law regulation of garbage in Cali-
fornia.  As explained in a prior California case, “many municipalities 
have enacted ordinances which restrict the right to collect and haul 
away trash to licensed collectors” and “prohibit unauthorized persons 
from tampering with trash containers.”308  Where such municipal pro-
tections apply, they should bring with them the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment.309 
The importance of a nuanced approach to these kinds of abandon-
ment issues has been heightened by new controversies over the collec-
tion and testing of genetic material.  Those who have been arrested for 
serious crimes can have their DNA collected against their will by a 
cheek swab,310 but for other targets, police instead must resort to sub-
terfuge.  Police have therefore collected DNA off of cigarettes, coffee 
cups, and even an envelope flap.311  In a very recent case the police 
collected DNA off of the chair a suspect used during a voluntary in-
terview with the police.312  Courts have generally found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to abandoned DNA, though com-
mentators have questioned whether existing doctrine can handle the 
question well.313 
Once again, positive law provides a framework.  At least ten states 
explicitly prohibit obtaining and testing a person’s genetic information  
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 307 Id. at 43. 
 308 People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (Cal. 1971) (citing L.A. COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCES 
NO. 5860, ch. IX, §§ 1611–1622, 1681–1691, 1710).  For examples of similar ordinances elsewhere 
in California and in other states, see POMONA, CAL., CODE § 62-593 (2015); COLUMBIA 
COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 90-192 (2014); HOLYOKE, MASS., CODE § 74-2(m) (2013); S. HOUS., 
TEX., CODE § 10.75 (2011); and NEWPORT NEWS, VA., CODE § 19-90(a)(47) (2015). 
 309 In Greenwood the Court also halfheartedly invoked the third-party doctrine, noting that 
“the trash collector . . . might himself have sorted through respondents’ trash or permitted others, 
such as the police, to do so.”  486 U.S. at 40.  But as we’ve discussed, supra section III.B.1, pp. 
1871–76, the possibility that the trash collector could lawfully have turned the trash over does not 
mean that the police can steal the trash before he gets it. 
 310 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
 311 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Essay, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and 
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 860–62 (2006); see also SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA 
SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE 108–22 (2011). 
 312 Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 754 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015). 
 313 Joh, supra note 311, at 868–69. 
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without their consent.314  It is also possible, albeit “unlikely,” that the 
collection of genetic material could be construed as common law lar-
ceny in states without such a statute.315  In those states, officers who 
surreptitiously collect and test DNA are using the special power of the 
state to investigate crime and ought to be subject to the reasonableness 
requirement.  The remaining states have so far made the judgment 
that DNA testing of one’s discarded skin cells does not warrant legal 
prohibition, though there is some evidence that more states may extend 
such protection.316  The positive law model will follow these changes 
where they go, rather than adopt the categorical antipathy of the cur-
rent doctrine. 
2.  Drones. — The positive law model also leaps to assist courts in 
resolving controversies about the use and regulation of drones — un-
manned aircraft that can be used for surveillance, among other things.  
Many state and federal law enforcement agencies are working to in-
corporate drones into their police practices,317 but current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine focused on reasonable expectations of privacy 
will be slow to catch up.318  Will aerial surveillance, even of homes, be 
categorically exempt from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, or will it 
demonstrate the limits of the Court’s prior holdings in Riley and 
Ciraolo?  The positive law has answers. 
As a matter of common law, “[f]light by aircraft in the air space 
above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into 
the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it inter-
feres substantially with the other’s use and enjoyment of his land.”319  
This would impose some direct constraints on the use of drones over 
private property — based on the proximity and consequences of the 
flight. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 314 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a) (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(A) (2015); see 
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 317 Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to Domestic 
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 318 See id. at 18–27.  See generally Robert Molko, The Drones Are Coming! Will the Fourth 
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 319 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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And there is more.  For those who think that drones require more 
specific regulation,320 legislation seems to be coming.  A new statute 
gives Oregon property owners a right to sue those who repeatedly fly a 
drone over their property “at a height of less than 400 feet.”321 
Other states have legislation that specifically targets private drones: 
North Dakota forbids “any private person to conduct surveillance on 
any other private person” via “unmanned aircraft” without consent, 
giving broader powers to the police.322  Texas and Tennessee similarly 
forbid the use of drones to capture images of people or privately 
owned property without consent, but with a series of modest excep-
tions for law enforcement.323  These sorts of government exceptions il-
lustrate the importance of the positive law model.  Under our model 
these statutes all clarify that government use of a drone to gather in-
formation is a search (a conclusion that, we reiterate, might well have 
been true under the common law anyway).324 
Congress has also ordered the FAA to integrate drones into the 
regulations governing national airspace.325  And in February 2015, the 
FAA proposed regulations governing drones.326  These rules will likely 
bring still further uniformity and clarity to the positive law rules gov-
erning drones, and hence drone surveillance.327 
3.  Seizures. — As we’ve noted already, most of the attention in 
Fourth Amendment commentary seems to go to searches, but its pro-
tection is equally applicable to seizures.  And the law of seizures is al-
ready governed by something fairly close to the positive law model, so 
we would simply iron out a few wrinkles. 
Under current doctrine a seizure of things — houses, papers, ef-
fects — happens “when there is some meaningful interference with an 
individual’s possessory interests in that property.”328  The references to 
“possessory interests” already invoke property law, and indeed most  
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 320 See, e.g., Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 187 (2015). 
 321 OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (2013).  Other provisions of the statute criminalize the use of 
drones to shoot bullets and point lasers at airplanes, id. § 837.995(1), and specifically regulate the 
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(2015). 
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 325 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332, 126 Stat. 11, 73–75. 
 326 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (pro-
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 327 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. 
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 328 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
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seizures of property are simply applications of positive law tout  
court — either conversion329 or trespass to chattels.330 
To be sure, in a few cases the positive law model might refine this 
test a little bit.  For instance, the requirement that the interference be 
“meaningful” has been said to limit Fourth Amendment seizures to 
“the government’s conversion of an individual’s private property, as 
opposed to the mere technical trespass to an individual’s private prop-
erty.”331  That would change under the positive law model.  Another 
change is that some claimants might be able to challenge a seizure on 
the basis of a nonpossessory positive law interest, such as a future in-
terest.332  But the differences seem technical and minor, even to us. 
The test for seizures of persons is pretty close to positive law too, 
though less explicitly so.  Some cases have defined “seizure of the per-
son” in reliance on common law,333 and while that’s not exactly the 
same as the positive law model, it’s very close.  A seizure of a person is 
“meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual’s freedom 
of movement,”334 whether by physical contact335 or some threat or as-
sertion of authority that limits one’s “freedom to walk away.”336  The 
tort of false imprisonment largely tracks this inquiry by rendering tor-
tious the intentional confinement of another person within fixed 
boundaries, including by threat of physical force prompting  
submission.337 
Once again, the positive law model would work some modest alter-
ations to seizure doctrine.  Both false imprisonment and Fourth 
Amendment seizures generally require an intent to restrain or con-
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Clancy, What Constitutes an “Arrest” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 48 VILL. 
L. REV. 129, 141–42 (2003) (“The common law definition of arrest is exactly the same as the Su-
preme Court’s current definition of a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 334 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 n.5 (1984). 
 335 See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624 (finding sufficient “the mere grasping or application of phys-
ical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee”). 
 336 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 n.1 
(2009). 
 337 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35–41 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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fine,338 but that intent requirement may be subtly different in ambigu-
ous cases.339  Additionally, the means of restraint might not be exactly 
the same under current Fourth Amendment doctrine and other private 
law.340  Under current doctrine, any physical contact by a police officer 
effects a seizure if the individual submits to it.  Such slight physical 
contact is not always enough to create a tort. 
4.  Open Fields Reconsidered. — In 1924, in Hester v. United 
States, the Court held that “the special protection accorded by the 
Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and 
effects,’ is not extended to the open fields,” meaning any place beyond 
the area immediately surrounding the home, referred to as the curti-
lage.341  After Katz, the decision could have been rejected as outmod-
ed, a reflection of the kind of literalism the Katz Court disparaged.  
But that was not to be.  Instead, in 1984, in Oliver v. United States, 
the Court reaffirmed the open fields doctrine by supplying a new ra-
tionale: “no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open 
fields.”342 
At a minimum, the positive law model eliminates the modern ra-
tionale for the open fields doctrine.  If the reasonable expectation of 
privacy no longer defines a search, the absence of such an expectation 
in open fields is no longer relevant.  What should matter instead is 
whether an ordinary person would be free to enter a privately owned 
but open field in the course of snooping around or grabbing something.  
We rather doubt it, and the Court seems to doubt it too,343 but as ever 
the answer depends on the details. 
On the other hand, the positive law model of the Fourth Amend-
ment does not directly address the original justification for the open 
fields restriction given in Hester, though we are not sure whether its 
limited reading of “effects” is consistent with the general tenor of the 
positive law model or is otherwise interpretively sound.344  But under 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 338 See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989) (seizure); Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 
872 P.2d 559, 567 (Cal. 1994) (false imprisonment). 
 339 Compare Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (finding a seizure even “[w]hen the 
actions of the police do not show an unambiguous intent to restrain . . . if in view of all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not 
free to leave” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Fermino, 872 P.2d at 567 (requiring intent 
to restrain). 
 340 Compare Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, with Scofield v. Critical Air Med., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 915, 920 (1996). 
 341 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).  
 342 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
 343 Id. at 179.  But see Sawers, supra note 22, at 490–97 (arguing that American law, unlike 
British law, frequently countenances traffic through open fields). 
 344 Madison’s original proposal for what became the Fourth Amendment referred not to “ef-
fects” but to “other property.”  Madison, supra note 118, at 443.  It is unclear whether the term 
“effects” was substituted because it was thought to be broader, narrower, or simply stylistically 
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the positive law model, that may indeed be the question, as the Court 
seemed to recognize in its property-based opinion in Jones, where it re-
turned to stressing that an “information-gathering intrusion on an 
‘open field’ did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search even 
though it was a trespass at common law,” because “an open field . . . is 
not one of those protected areas enumerated in the Fourth  
Amendment.”345 
D.  Implementing the Positive Law Model 
As we conceive it, the positive law model is about the Fourth 
Amendment’s first step: the threshold determination of whether a 
search or seizure has taken place, not the consequences that follow 
from the conclusion that one has occurred.  At the second step, the 
Constitution asks whether the search or seizure is “unreasonable,” but 
it remains debated what the necessary reasonableness entails, and es-
pecially what the implications of the presence or absence of a warrant 
are for the reasonableness analysis.  In our view, the positive law mod-
el does not answer those questions, and so we are inclined to leave the 
reasonableness debate to existing doctrine and existing critics.346  
That said, in explicating the first of these two steps of the Fourth 
Amendment we are not wholly committed to the labels that the two 
steps have acquired — search and seizure, followed by reasonableness.  
We have simply been accepting the long-used terminology.  But we 
could also imagine, for instance, a world where the word “search” does 
very little work347 and where both steps take place under the reason-
ableness label instead.  So long as the model in that world had the 
same structure — a range of searches subject to no scrutiny because 
they are on the same legal terms as private activity, and a range of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
more appealing.  The Oliver Court thought the “term ‘effects’ to be limited to personal, rather 
than real, property,” 466 U.S. at 177 n.7, and in another context the antebellum Supreme Court 
agreed that “effects,” standing alone, “means all kinds of personal estate,” Planters’ Bank v. 
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 345 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, 176–77); see 
also id. at 953 n.8 (“The Fourth Amendment protects against trespassory searches only with re-
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only if we thought the second clause amounts to a warrant requirement. 
 347 See sources cited supra note 241. 
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searches subject to special scrutiny because of the government’s special 
legal powers — it would generally work the same way as our model. 
We can also imagine, though we do not wholly endorse, other ways 
to implement some of the insights of the positive law model.  For in-
stance, some might use the positive law model as a floor, but not a ceil-
ing, of what should constitute a search or seizure (or the other way 
around).  Others might use the positive law model to define reasonable 
expectations of privacy under Katz rather than to replace them.348  
While we have proposed something more categorical here, we hope the 
model can provide useful insights even to those who would prefer to 
implement it in somewhat different ways. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For half a century, Fourth Amendment law has marched ahead un-
der the banner of the reasonable expectation of privacy, seemingly 
oblivious to overwhelming force arrayed against it.  The test is ambig-
uous, ahistorical, unpredictable, and fundamentally un-legal.  Its sur-
vival is surely a function of one of its greatest defects: the highly con-
textual and subjective analysis it entails makes it difficult to identify 
clear errors.  On the rare occasions where it has been used to establish 
clear rules, the results have been howlers (think again of the third-
party doctrine). 
The positive law model offers much more.  It is conceptually clear, 
theoretically sound, less subjective, more legal, and responsive both to 
social fact and technological change.  As we have said, the positive law 
model provides considerable protection to interests in privacy, but it 
does so indirectly, reflecting the conviction that the Fourth Amend-
ment has a bigger aim at heart: protection from abuse of official pow-
er.  Governmental supersession of general law presents a more funda-
mental threat to individual freedom and autonomy than invasions of 
privacy alone, though the two often overlap, as famous dystopian nov-
els remind us.  We therefore urge a greater recognition of the principle 
at the core of the Fourth Amendment. 
 The argument we have made draws upon constitutional history 
while creating a flexible legal model capable of adapting to new tech-
nologies and present needs.  So much of constitutional law is con-
sumed by methodological debates, but it is a happy accident that the 
positive law model does not create the usual disconnect between 
originalist interpretation and an approach to constitutional law cen-
tered on contemporary sensibilities.  There is no need to modify the 
fundamental doctrine embodied in the Fourth Amendment and update 
it for modern life.  The same rule — that actions by government offi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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cials in derogation of general law require special scrutiny — is as read-
ily applied today as at the time the Fourth (and Fourteenth) Amend-
ment was adopted.  The content of positive law has surely changed in 
many ways, but the overarching constitutional principle has not.349  
On the threshold of a revolution in Fourth Amendment law eight de-
cades ago, Felix Frankfurter wrote that “[o]ur own days furnish sol-
emn reminders that police and prosecutors and occasionally even judg-
es will, if allowed, employ illegality and yield to passion, with the same 
justification of furthering the public weal as their predecessors relied 
upon for the brutalities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”350  
The observation that the Fourth Amendment should confront police 
“illegality” is timeless.  The time to take it seriously is now. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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